

safe to do that which is only probable, then nothing could be done till something were demonstrated, and then in moral theology, we should often stand still and suspend our act, but seldom do anything. Yea, sometimes it happens that false things are made more probable than true. And it is remarkable that Cicero (*Pro font. c. IX.*) saith that "*Arbitror*" is "*verbum consideratissimum.*" Aristotle (*Eth. Nic. l. 1. c. 1*) says: "He is well instructed who expects that manner of proof of things which the nature of things will bear." And in moral things it is sufficient that a thing be judged true and certain though by an uncertain argument, and the opinion may be practically certain, when the knowledge of it is in speculation only probable."

Again, in his Rules, Bishop Taylor says, Book 1, c. 4. Rule 11:—

"He that hath given assent to one part of a probable opinion may lawfully depose that conscience and that opinion upon confidence of the sentence (opinion) of another. Rule 13. He that is asked concerning a case that is on either side probable may answer against his own opinion, if the contrary be probable and more safe or more expedient and favourable. Rule 14. When the guide of souls is of a different opinion from his charge or penitent, he is not bound to exact conformity to his own opinion which is but probable, but may proceed according to the conscience of the penitent. Rule 15. The sentence (opinion) or arbitrament of a good man, though it be of itself but probable, yet it is more than a probable warranty in actions otherwise undeterminable. "*Sicut vir prudens eam definierit*" is the great measure which Aristotle (*Eth. Nic. l. 11. c. 6*, tom 2, p. 1107) and all the moral philosophers assign to very many cases and questions.—Book 1, c. 5, Rule 6. It is lawful for the conscience to proceed to action against a doubt that is merely speculative. For there is nothing but a weak man may be made to doubt of; for if the speculative doubting conscience should always prevail in practice, the weak and ignorant might be abused and made miserable in all things, and the most knowing in very many."

So far writes Jeremy Taylor. All that is valuable in his work, its plan, order, and the subjects he treats of, are evidently taken from some Catholic casuists of the time, and of course he changes what he does not like. For example, in the chapters on laws, he destroys the beautiful order of the Catholic *Treatise de Legibus*, which sets forth the independence of the Church; and, in the true spirit of protestantism, he makes the civil power supreme.

Book 3, c. 2. The supreme civil power is also supreme over all persons and in all causes ecclesiastical. Rule 6. Kings have a legislative power in the affairs of religion and the Church.

Bishop Butler—"Probability the guide of life."

Bishop Butler, in his *Analogy*, Introd. p. 7, has the following remarks on Probability:

"Probable evidence, in its very nature, affords but an imperfect kind of information, and is to be considered only as relative to