## North-South Relations

countries and gain access to financial and commercial information; to improve further the record on family reunification and travel for family meetings; to improve working conditions for journalists; and generally to try to achieve a freer flow of people, information and ideas across frontiers between East and West. Many of these ideas came up in the presentations made last autumn to the parliamentary subcommittee of this House on the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe in preparation for the Madrid conference, and appeared in the recommendations that were tabled in this House.

The Canadian position at Madrid is that progress should be made in developing co-operation and restoring confidence across the whole range of provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. To do so we must also make progress in a further area where confidence between East and West is woefully lacking and which directly affects Canadians' perception of détente, and that is in human rights.

The western nations have put forward proposals at Madrid for the protection of Helsinki monitors, for the right to practise religion, individually or in a community, and this is Canada's idea, for holding a meeting of experts of all participating states to discuss the approaches to human rights and the role that individuals and governments play in the exercise and protection of those rights.

After months of discussion and negotiations, eastern and western approaches to the key issues of security and human rights have not yet been reconciled at Madrid. We believe, however, that the negotiations must continue as long as there are some prospects of substantive results. Here the question of the political issue comes into the picture. With those words, I will move on to my last topic.

This has to do with the report that was published last fall by the United Nations entitled "A Comprehensive Study on Nuclear Weapons". That report, among other things which time does not permit me to put on record, notes that from 1968 to 1979 the total number of strategic nuclear warheads increased from 4,500 to at least 9,200 in the United States and from 1,000 to at least 6,000 in the U.S.S.R. These figures are probably outdated by a year and a half if not two years.

The report further points out that the exact number of nuclear warheads in the world today is probably not known by any single person or institution. Estimates cannot be verified officially. Published figures indicate, however, that the total may be in excess of 40,000. In terms of explosive power, these warheads are reported to range from about 100 tons up to more than 20 million tons equivalent of chemical high explosive.

The largest weapon ever tested released an energy of approximately 4,000 times that of the atomic bomb that levelled Hiroshima. There is in principle no upper limit to the explosive limit that may be obtained. The present total strength of arsenals may be equivalent to about one million Hiroshima bombs, some 13 billion tons of TNT.

I will stop there because enough has been quoted to raise the following question that came to my mind when reading parts of this report which was made public last fall. Against this nuclear background, the question that comes to mind is how can a claim be made that we will resume negotiations, or that any side can resume negotiations once it no longer perceives itself to be in a position of weakness? How do you measure and achieve a perfect degree of balance in this kind of business?

Let me put it a different way. Who is to assure us that the other side is prepared to negotiate with us when they are in the position of weakness when we are superior, when we are not willing to negotiate with them when they are superior to us in strength? If we are not prepared to negotiate out of a position of weakness, what makes us assume that the other side would, or, to put it in another form—and I will conclude with this—if each side is prepared to negotiate with the other side only when in a position of superiority, when, if ever, will both sides perceive to be superior to the other side at the same time? Here, in conclusion, I say to you, are the elements of a modern Greek drama entitled "The Nuclear Spiral". Thank you, Mr. Speaker.

## • (2120)

Mr. Donald W. Munro (Esquimalt-Saanich): Mr. Speaker, I should like to express my appreciation at this time for the opportunity of taking part in a debate on a government motion on the matter of external affairs. This really is almost unique. It is not unique to the extent that it is the second opportunity we have had in my lifetime in Parliament, which is almost eight and a half years—I repeat, the second time within eight and a half years—to debate external affairs in this House on a government motion. We note the condescension and hypocrisy oozing from that side this afternoon because of what they perceived to be their magnanimity in having brought forward a motion of this sort to be debated in the House on this occasion. No one to my knowledge, and I have sat through all the speeches, has read this motion into the record with all the inflaming words used in it. It is really earth shaking. Let me read it. It states:

That this House take note of the present state and future prospects of Canada's international relations and endorse the broad thrust of the report of the Parliamentary Task Force on North-South Relations.

I might add that there is no vote on this motion but we are to take note and endorse.

When the Secretary of State for External Affairs (Mr. MacGuigan) rose to speak today, he did endorse the broad thrust of the report. Without going much further than that, he endorsed it. It was also notable that it was the first time in this House, to my knowledge, and I stand to be corrected on this, that this Prime Minister (Mr. Trudeau) has taken part in a debate on foreign affairs.

Let us recognize as well that this government demolished an opportunity for this House to make an inquiry into foreign policy, as drawn up by the government of the Right Hon. Leader of the Opposition (Mr. Clark). Not only did this