

has been the suggestion, for example, that Germany might have the same relationship to NATO as France, namely participation in its political affairs but not in its integrated military structure. But this approach is really only a variant of a neutral Germany and leaves the question of the country's security regime up in the air. As these discussions wear on, it is becoming increasingly apparent that ad-hoc solutions will not work, that the question of Germany in NATO is more than the last great item of repair work of the cold war. Instead, it is the first great item in building a new cooperative security system for Europe. To understand why, it is necessary for the West to appreciate the Soviet Union's security concerns about German unification.

As we see it, Soviet concerns are of two kinds, fears of the past repeating itself and fears of a future in which the Soviet Union is excluded from Europe. We got some sense of the former during a visit to the Soviet war memorial in Leningrad. The German siege of Leningrad lasted 3 1/2 years, during which time some 1.5 million out of a total city population of 2.5 million were killed. We were told there was not a family that was unaffected by the war, a story that was repeated on a still vaster scale throughout the Soviet Union. Considering this history, our Intourist guide surprised us when she remarked that, while her mother could not think or talk about the Germans, she regarded unification as a natural and normal thing. "What was done was done by the fascists."

From this incident, we infer that the memory of the war has a powerful influence in colouring Soviet thinking about German unification but is perhaps not the determining factor. The real Soviet fear, we suspect, is that the settlement of the German question could have the effect, or be interpreted as having the effect, of excluding the Soviet Union from Europe. Mr. Gorbachev's central foreign policy objective, declared in his book *Perestroika* and repeated endlessly since, is to bring the Soviet Union into Europe and the wider world community as quickly and completely as possible. The opening of the Soviet Union to the world, and of the world to the Soviet Union, are not peripheral objectives, to be pursued as a distraction from the real problems at home, but rather integral parts of the goal of transforming the Soviet Union economically and politically.

If we recognize this, then the West should also understand why apparent concessions, like the willingness to have Soviet troops remain in East Germany for some time after unification, may be unattractive from the Soviet point of view. What such a concession amounts to is reinforcement of the old image of the USSR as occupier of Eastern Europe, an image Mr. Gorbachev has done so much to dispel. If, in addition, those troops were to be paid for by the west, the USRR might fear acquiring an unattractive new image of mendicant.