2 EARLY WARNING, AND PAST POTENTIAL

The first section will look at early warning in the Rwandan context, to determine if the international community knew enough to have acted differently. The second section will discuss whether international community could have made a difference if it had acted differently on that intelligence.

2.1 Intelligence Gathering & Decision Makers

Certainly the specifics of the Rwandan crisis were unique and more horrific than might have been anticipated. However there is clear proof that many parts of the international community, both NGO² and UN³ were fully aware of the incipient crisis in Rwanda. What is not clear and may never be known is the extent to which individual countries had their own intelligence on what was happening. It would be particularly surprising if France did not have a rather complete awareness of what was occurring within military and governing circles of the RG and RGF inasmuch as they were closely involved and supportive of both parts of the ruling élite. Other countries in view of the small size and strategic unimportance of Rwanda, would invariably have relied more on NGO and UN intelligence. Fortunately this was not lacking, unfortunately they do not seem to have used it.

² ie. Amnesty International: report "Rwanda, persecution of Tutsi minority and repression of government critics 1990-1992" (Afr 47/02/92) which talked of more than 1,000 extrajudicial executions, and the over 8,000 political prisoners following the October 1990 invasion by the RPF.

Human Rights Watch: "Rwanda, Talking Peace and Waging War: human rights since the October 1990 invasion", pp. 33 Feb. 27 1992, or "Beyond The Rhetoric: continuing human rights abuses in Rwanda", pp. 29 June 1993, or "Arming Rwanda: the arms trade and human rights abuses in the Rwandan War", pp. 66 January 1994.

ICHRDD, UIDH, FIDH, and HRW, combined to produce the March 1993 "Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights Violations in Rwanda Since 1 October 1990". The commission inter alia concluded that the government had participated in or sanctioned the killing of over 2,000 individuals.

³ Of particular note was the report of the Special Rapporteur Waly Bacré Ndiaye on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions. In view of the seriousness of events in Rwanda, he submitted a lengthy 36 page addendum to his main report to the UNCHR, in which he reported on his mission to Rwanda from 8 to 17 April 1993 (almost exactly one year before the April 6th plane crash). Not only were his observations and recommendations detailed, he published this report on the 11th of August 1993. In addition, his report was formally tabled during the 50th session of the Commission on Human Rights in February 1994.