

make up for their decreasing size.”³⁶

To implement RMA doctrine, much emphasis is placed in the United States upon “jointness” compelling the Army, Air Force, and Navy to work together. Since the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, and especially after the Gulf War, this has been almost dogma in U.S. defence planning for overseas operations. In October 1999, the United States Atlantic Command, based in Norfolk, Virginia was renamed, United States Joint Forces Command, (USJFCOM), The new command, is to serve as “the joint development owner” for the entire American military “responsible for developing the methodology to deploy all military forces for rapid and decisive military force power projection from the continental United States.”³⁷

In 1994 Jeffrey Cooper argued that the United States must go beyond jointness to integration in order to obtain the full benefits of the RMA. The perspective must be changed “from improving the individual elements of combat power...to integrating and focusing the power of the ‘whole’. Integration of the whole rather than enhancement of the parts is the central pillar of this RMA,” and “the campaign plan and joint operations” are the “defining level for measuring effectiveness.”³⁸

The short-war dominated RMA doctrines may be an “illusion” and a dangerous one. Trying to convert technology into “lasting” operational and strategic superiority may simply invite potential opponents to resort to strategic surprise or pre-emption as in the case of Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor. Strategic decisions have not been speeded or revolutionized by the RMA and Washington will be surprised again as it was in Somalia and Kosovo and with regard to ballistic missile proliferation. History shows, that “forces optimized for fast-paced, intensive, but brief war had to fight protracted and unwinnable wars of attrition that exacted enormous costs and domestic dissatisfaction. When the United States advertises its intention to avoid protracted wars, it makes that outcome more likely than not.”³⁹

There are also doubts about a revolution in military organization. As the RMA has taken hold, it appears that predictions about fundamental changes in military organization have proven to be premature, especially in the United States. Stephen Blank notes that, “The continuing rivalry among the services is one aspect of U.S. military life that has not been revolutionized by the RMA.”

³⁶ Thierry Gongora, “The Shape of Things to Come: Sizing up the Revolution in Military Affairs,” in David G. Haglund and S. Neil MacFarlane, Eds, *Security, Strategy and the Global Economics of Defense Production*, (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press, 1999), p. 40.

³⁷ “USACom Redesignated to U.S. Joint Forces Command,” *Marine Corps Gazette* (83) (November 1999), p. 8.

³⁸ Jeffrey Copper, *Another View of the Revolution in Military Affairs*, (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute U.S. Army War College, 1994). pp. 34-5.

³⁹ Blank “The Illusion of a Short-War,” p. 142.