## (Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

challenge inspection for use in order to clarify doubts about compliance. In the view of my authorities all these existing provisions are valuable and should be preserved.

However, we are concerned about what seems to us areas of weaknesses in the present inspection framework. Some of these areas are of major significance for the viability of the convention. Let us consider some of them:

Schedule [3] chemicals, produced for legitimate purposes but usable as chemical weapons or precursors: so far no routine inspection for them;

The many thousands of industrial chemical facilities and military and other facilities not subject to declaration, which may be capable of playing a role in establishing a clandestine chemical weapons capability: no routine inspection as yet for them either;

Even on sites where some activities are subject to verification, other activities are not covered by any provisions for routine inspection.

We believe that the inspection framework must be strengthened. The solution needs to provide adequate assurance and deterrence for the large numbers of facilities concerned. It needs to be both workable and cost-effective.

A number of possible solutions have been suggested, which have made valuable contributions to thinking on this subject. I have in mind in particular the proposal by the Federal Republic of Germany for an additional verification system based on <u>ad hoc</u> checks. My authorities would like to submit an alternative option for consideration by this Conference. Our proposal owes much to these previous suggestions I have mentioned, as well as to experience in operating the inspection system established under the Stockholm document. I should like now to describe our suggestion.

The United Kingdom proposes an on-site inspection system which, together with the existing provisions in CD/881, would in our view adequately complete the inspection framework. We would call it "ad hoc inspection", and it would be on the following lines:

Each State party would have the right to initiate inspections by the Technical Secretariat in civil and military facilities and elsewhere on the territory of any other State party.

These requests would not be linked to any allegation of breach of the convention.

Each State party would have the right to request a stated number of inspections a year and would be obliged to receive up to a stated total of inspections a year. The exact numbers are open to discussion. This quota system is one aspect distinguishing <u>ad hoc</u> from challenge inspection.