

developing common positions on defence and anticipating potentially divisive issues. This has not always been the case, however, and fuller use can and should be made of the PJBD in future.

Canada should also resort to multilateral approaches whenever possible, in order to emphasize the basic point that the defence of North America is an integral part of the defence of the North Atlantic Treaty area. Specific proposals for doing so have already been mentioned above in the section on NATO. Consideration should also be given to creating some sort of North American Maritime Defence arrangement which would enhance Canada-US cooperation within the NATO framework.

The recent Defence White Paper promises to improve the capacity of Canada to contribute both to the defence of North America and to the protection of Canadian sovereignty. In particular, the proposals to create a three-ocean navy, to reinforce the capability for surveillance and defence of Canadian territory, and to enlarge and revitalize the reserve forces will enhance Canada's ability to exercise effective control and if necessary to defend Canadian territory. At the same time, the proposed acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines has been the subject of considerable public debate.

The government's case is based on the advantages of nuclear-powered submarines, as part of a balanced force, for maritime patrol and anti-submarine warfare tasks in the Atlantic and the Pacific, and only secondarily of their under-ice capability in the Arctic. In this broader context they may well be cost effective, but one qualification should nevertheless be mentioned. It is that the acquisition of nuclear-powered submarines may place an enormous strain on scarce defence resources at a time when the Canadian Forces are facing so many other problems of shortages and obsoles-