

ganda is a tribute to the universal desire for peace which they would exploit for their own purposes. This is a dangerous course, dangerous even to those who hope to profit by it. For people, even the Russian people deprived as they are of access to the truth about political events, cannot be deceived forever. The game of pinning the name of aggressor on the victims of aggression cannot continue indefinitely and the disillusionment of people who, in their political simplicity, are signing the so-called Stockholm Peace Appeal, will, in the end, act as a boomerang against communist imperialism itself. For sooner or later it will become clear to all, as it is clear to most of us now, what kind of peace the Cominform has in mind. It is the peace that prevails in a state dominated by one party, one political faith, one group of self-perpetuating rulers, one political prophet; the peace of the policeman and the gaol.

We want peace but not that kind of peace. Nor will we be led by any number of plausible answers to manufactured questions, or by superficially impressive resolutions about the prevention of war, reduction of armaments, the banning of weapons, to put ourselves in a position again where this kind of dead peace can be imposed on us by dictators. It is for genuine peace, based on the absence of fear and the presence of friendship and co-operation that we long. Furthermore, we are anxious not only to talk about peace and to pass resolutions about it but to do something about it. It seems to us that the first practical step which we can take for peace is to put the security factor into the disarmament equation. We can disarm if—and only if—we are sure that in doing so we are not exposing our people to dangers from others who *say* they are disarming but are not doing so. If we are going to disarm ourselves, we must know—by seeing for ourselves and not merely by being told—that other people are disarming as well. We have in fact, the right of continuous reassurance that the olive branch does not conceal 175 divisions. It is with these considerations in mind that we are bound to examine the resolution which the Soviet Government has introduced into this Assembly on the subject of peace and disarmament. We should approach it with an open mind and a constructive spirit. This, I confess, would be easier if we had not had a painfully disillusioning experience with a whole series of Soviet resolutions in the past, couched in the most pacific

terms, purporting to be contributions to the cause of peace which, on closer examination, have proven to be something else indeed. Nevertheless, the issues of the present time are too grave and the dangers are too acute for us to brush aside any proposal put forward in the name of peace. So we must apply to the Soviet proposal some touchstone which will enable us to see whether this is merely an echo of past performances or whether, within it, is to be found some firm ground for a step forward. For if we see the promise of even a short step in the direction of peace, we must not fail to take it.

The Soviet resolution covers a lot of ground, a good deal of which we have been over before in previous Assemblies. It speaks of the desirability of concluding a five-power peace pact, of reducing the present armed forces of these five great powers by one-third during 1950, that is during the next three months—a transparently insincere and meaningless proposal. The resolution also urges the Assembly to declare itself “in favour of the unconditional prohibition of atomic weapons and the establishment of strict international control for the unconditional implementation of this prohibition”.

My delegation is first of all interested in establishing what precisely is meant by these far-flung proposals, and we think that there is one very simple and direct test of the sincerity of those who have made them. There is one clear question which, if it could be answered by the Soviet Delegate, would go far to resolve our doubts. What does he mean when he says he is in favour of strict international control of atomic energy, or, indeed, of armaments generally? He used that phrase—strict international control—several times in the course of his very interesting statement to the General Assembly in introducing the resolution. He spoke at some length to the last session of the Assembly on the same subject. The Canadian delegation have studied his remarks with the care which they deserve, no doubt other delegations also, but we are quite unable to determine whether the Soviet view of international control differs in the slightest degree from what has been previously put forward by the Soviet representative, and which have been shown to be quite inadequate and unsatisfactory. Therefore, before the Soviet resolution on disarmament comes to a vote at this Assembly, we have the right to ask for a clarification of the Soviet concept of international inspection and control as applied to the