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Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev invites U.S. President Richard Nixon to precede him to the podium as the Russian leader was welcomed to the White House in June of last year to begin their series of summit talks. Mr. Nixon had visited Moscow in May 1972, where a number of accords were signed that were designed, in the words of the President's report to Congress, to "turn away from the confrontations of the past quarter-century".

up the greatest opportunities for man's physical and spiritual perfection". In the words of *Punch*, "you might call the situation Kafkaesque, except that the name of Franz Kafka does not officially exist...".

Origins of détente

What, then, is the balance between the intuitive pessimism of Giraudoux and the calculated optimism of contemporary statesmen about relations with the Soviet Union? Détente has its orgins in fear and disarray - fear of the dreadful possibilities of modern war, fear of China, disarray in the Western alliance prompted partly by the recovery of Europe and the resurgence of Japan, and disarray in the East European alliance, which has been held together by virtue of two military invasions in the last 17 years. Détente is manifested in efforts to achieve a balanced reduction of military forces, in increased exchanges in the areas of science and culture and in the expansion of trade. The uncertain hopes embodied in these developments are at least better than an "uncertain trumpet", and it is no doubt necessary to persevere, not so much because there is great reason for hope as because there is little alternative to it.

'Détente has its origins in fear and disarray...'

Few people know, and least of all doms demics, the intricacies of the milimust calculus, but it seems reasonable to assisons that the Soviet Union is unlikely to redneed its military strength substantially as best as it has NATO on one flank and Chinampor the other. If such a reduction does securi place, it should be linked, in the Soquid view, with a guarantee of the status quis son Eastern Europe. The problem with and s objective is that it is beyond the powerained any group of statesmen, however wilmay their agreement. If Vietnam has taughtelud anything, it should be that "no army apid withstand the strength of an idea wour ef time has come". We may, if we wish, acc to Soviet demands for permanent band e daries that cannot be altered by aid, means and, secure in that achievemsovie reduce the forces that are assembled athat y them. We shall not thereby have increase cou Soviet security, for its insecurity lies in nic co nature of its empire and not in the cono cision of its frontiers - just as, in the curren of some, the insecurity of the West maAt an in the decay of its moral and social falind (All of which is not to say that we shoroba refrain from doing our best in the Out. I ference on Security and Co-operationt seen Europe (CSCE) and seeking with all ain 1 ingenuity at our command a reductionerce forces that might help to change attitutere in both societies in the talks being held Vienna. It is simply to say that we shittle not delude ourselves into thinking t wo armed forces are the cause of the consual and that stability will follow their reiffers

tion, however measured. A second option is one to which rank West attaches great importance - "4 pre dom of movement". I hope I shall not sation obtuse or facetious if I fail to view with 973) assurance the manner in which the should ping of thousands of Americans to Inion Soviet Union and vice versa will he its about "understanding". One could equiush well argue, it would seem, that the ohould site effect might be achieved. We ar orați seems, imbued in North America with nion notion that "to know us is to love us" remain convinced that, if only we could enough people in a position to report wi and accurately in the Soviet Union f sta and they would be on the path to mintere respect. This seems to overlook the ar that Brezhnev put so well when he ulf, "our world views are irreconcilable" - act, in short, fantasy. It is, nevertheless, arm h dream we must follow because it is of xem the few we have and it might come trierha

Scientific, academic and cultural hink changes are in a different category and hink very important in so far as they contribute to the merging of those "opposing!