

POSSIBILITY OF A REASONABLY SATISFACTORY FINAL PACKAGE, I.E. CREATES THE CONDITIONS FOR A POSITIVE SUM GAME. OBVIOUSLY IT CREATES FOR MIDDLE POWERS A RANGE OF OPPORTUNITIES IN SELECTING PARTNERS ON AN ISSUE-SPECIFIC BASIS TO ENHANCE NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE VIS-À-VIS THE BIG POWERS. THERE SHOULD BE MORE ANALYSIS OF THE ROLE FOR MIDDLE POWERS IN A MULTI POLAR WORLD. IT SEEMS TO ME THAT WHILE THE BIG POWERS CAN BLOCK ACTION THEY SEEM UNABLE, ESPECIALLY WHEN DIVIDED BY POLITICAL, CULTURAL AND DEEP-SEATED ECONOMIC DIFFERENCES, TO CATALYSE CHANGE.

THE DANGER OF A PROCESS BASED MAINLY ON STRATEGIC DEPLOYMENT OF ISSUE-SPECIFIC COALITIONS IS, HOWEVER, THE SAME AS THAT ARISING FROM THE ROLE OF INTEREST GROUP LOBBIES IN DOMESTIC POLICY MAKING I.E. FREE RIDING. IN OTHER WORDS, IN SUCH A PROCESS THERE IS NO GUARDIAN OF THE SYSTEM -- THE INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC GOOD. WHAT SINGLE INTEREST COALITION WOULD FOCUS ON SUCH SYSTEMIC ISSUES AS STRENGTHENING THE GATT SECRETARIAT TO ENABLE IT TO CATALYSE POLICY DISCUSSION ON THE LINKS BETWEEN TRADE POLICY AND STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN BOTH DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES; THE IMPACT OF EXCHANGE RATES ON TRADE AND CAPITAL FLOWS; THE ROLE OF SERVICES IN DEVELOPMENT AND THE PROVISION OF STATISTICAL AND ANALYTICAL ASSISTANCE TO DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THIS