

Until general agreement on disarmament is reached, however, we must support the maintenance of an adequate deterrent to war to make it quite apparent to any would-be aggressor that he cannot use force as an instrument of policy without running the risk of devastating retaliation. It is necessary, therefore, for us to maintain our forces both here and abroad as part of the deterrent of the West. It is our fervent hope that these two primary elements of defence policy will succeed and that war will be averted. However, there is an element of miscalculation and misunderstanding that cannot as yet be removed from international relations; therefore it is prudent that these deterrent forces should be so designed that they will be of use to blunt any attack and to assist in survival.

Defence Policy

With these observations in mind I would now refer to Canada's defence policy. This policy was set forth in the paper on defence tabled at the end of April. This paper is intended to assist hon. members during these discussions. Anyone who has read it should have a better understanding of our policy and the state of our forces. The paper is not intended to be the instrument through which major new policy is announced. During the year changes in policy and the procurement of new equipment have been communicated to the House as decisions have been reached. The effects of these decisions are reflected in the estimates now before the Committee, and are detailed in the report.

The Committee will be aware of some of these important decisions, all of which, have been announced or referred to in the House during the past year; for example, the cancellation of the Arrow programme, adoption of the Bomarc missile and related semi-automatic ground environment; the acquisition of a surface-to-surface missile for the Canadian army; negotiations for the procurement of nuclear weapons announced by the Prime Minister on February 20 of this year; construction of six additional destroyer escorts; plans for a tanker supply ship to increase the range of the destroyer escorts and thus enable these ships to stay at sea for longer periods of time, and the granting of facilities at four Canadian air fields for SAC refuelling aircraft; the tasks assigned to the Canadian army with respect to survival operations and civil defence. Had a policy of withholding this information been followed and the first announcement given in the white paper it would indeed have been a sensational document.

The format of the report is not intended to copy what is known as a British white paper, although the latter does not always announce new policy. It will be recalled that in 1957 a so-called five-year plan was announced by the British Government with regard to defence. The details of this plan were, in general,