

At the same time, it should not be forgotten that there remains a large element of speculation in such scenarios, especially with regard to categories two and three. We have the record of the Gulf War, but it is inconclusive. The United States was not deterred from mounting a coalition against Iraq by the potential of WMD use against its forces. Was this because Washington was convinced that Iraq would not risk nuclear retaliation? Was Washington less sure of avoiding a WMD response if it had continued on to occupy Iraq and therefore was it deterred from doing so? In the case of the Kosovo campaign, would NATO have even mounted an attack if it knew or suspected that Yugoslavia had a limited number of WMDs? Yet how would they have been used and to what end?

The point here is that while the scenarios described above highlight some of the arms control implications of the RMA, they also draw attention to the uncertainties that remain as the United States grapples with the impact of the "revolution" it is bent on inciting.

WILL ARMS CONTROL SURVIVE THE RMA?

Whether revolutionary or evolutionary, the new technologies, military organizations and doctrines of warfare as fielded by the West, especially the United States are already having an impact on the way in which force is applied. In general, this suggests a growing military imbalance between the United States and other countries. And the expectation that more rapid advances will be made which will further widen the gap. Indeed, thinking has already begun on "The RMA After Next" with the suggestion that the next technological breakthrough will be the application of the "biotech revolution" to warfare.¹¹³ This is not surprising, since it is explicitly the goal of the American RMA effort to preserve a dominant military position and allow the United States to intervene quickly, effectively and at minimal cost overseas.

The RMA has not created new weapons or systems that are easily subjected to traditional arms control and verification. Regardless of RMA capability or not a state may still comply with or be subjected to arms control verification on WMD. Weapons that were subject to verification prior to RMA are still verifiable by the same means, even though those systems may have been altered or advanced as a result of RMA. But what the RMA has done is make the international control of WMDs more difficult because it has introduced into the international security environment enhanced conventional weapons which appear to give the United States and the West even more relative military power than they already possess and which can be used to further their own vision for global stability as they interpret it.

To this extent, the RMA seems to foretell a continuation of trends in international security relations which began with the end of the Cold War and which are generally favourable to the United States and its major allies. The major concern is that the RMA, as an instrument of Western power,

¹¹³ Lonnie D. Henley, "The RMA After Next," *Parameters* (29) (Winter 1999-2000), pp. 46-57.