## III. SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT, DEMOBILIZATION AND REINTEGRATION EFFORTS

This section on specific post-conflict peacebuilding experiences will examine the missions listed below with emphasis on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration operations. It will include a brief outline of the mission chronology followed by observations on the main lessons to be learned.

- United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA), 1989-90;
- United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), 1992-1993;
- Second United Nations Operation in Somalia, (UNOSOM II), 1993-95;
- United Nations Operation in Mozambique (ONUMOZ), 1992-94; and
- Mali/Sahara-Sahel Experience<sup>52</sup>, 1993-ongoing.

## Introduction

Historically, and with the partial exception of the Congo operation from 1960-63, UN peacekeeping operations typically involved monitoring the separation of forces according to an agreement which had been accepted by the belligerents. With the deployment of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group in Namibia (UNTAG) in 1989, the UN embarked on the first of many "modern" peacekeeping operations, characterized by their complexity, their multiple dimensions and the diversity of peacekeeping partners -- both military and civilian -- needed for the successful implementation of the peace agreement. In such circumstances, with mandates encompassing humanitarian relief, support for the reconstitution of civil authority and the monitoring of elections, UN missions became a "key player in an evolving search for a solution, rather than a passive monitor of a previously agreed settlement or arrangement." Among the many new dimensions of the mandate, was the implementation and monitoring of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration measures agreed to by the parties

## United Nations Observer Group in Central America (ONUCA)

The ONUCA mission was established in 1989, as a result of the CONTADORA peace process and the Esquipulas II Accord, in five Central American

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> In one very narrow sense, the Mali/Sahara-Sahel experience can be considered post-conflict in light of the rebellion by the Tuaregs in Northern Mali. However, it is more properly viewed as a largely preventive action for both Mali and its immediate neighbours.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> David Cox, "Peacekeeping and Disarmament" at page 84 in *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: The Issues*, UNIDIR Disarmament and Conflict Resolution Project, Volume 96/46.