

phase (CFE I), emphasis would be placed on reducing existing asymmetries, reducing the threat of surprise attack and large-scale offensive operations, and reducing overall levels by 10-15%. The second phase (CFE II) would actually focus on restructuring forces in line with the concept of reasonable sufficiency for defence, and on reducing forces and armaments an additional 25%. (Here one sees the beginning of an expectation for reciprocity in the actual restructuring of forces.) The final phase would involve further reductions and an actual coordination of any further military development so that it would remain in line with the defensive restructuring accomplished in the first two phases.⁹⁶ This plan of course, is outlined at a very general level and by now is dated by the fast pace of events in Eastern Europe. Nonetheless it demonstrates the central place that the concept of reasonable sufficiency had in the negotiation process, according to the Soviet view.⁹⁷

To some extent, acceptance of the principles of reasonable sufficiency may have allowed Soviet representatives to adopt a more flexible approach to the CFE negotiations. Although CFE is still being conducted on the basis of quantitative parameters, there has been a less obsessive concern with "bean-counting" and a greater appreciation of the end result, both for substantive and political reasons. This has been facilitated by the CFE emphasis on finding agreement on final levels of forces and armaments, rather than engaging in endless debate over data and what levels exist before reducing. It is significant that Chernyshev identified this as the main issue distinguishing

⁹⁶ See, for example, the interview with Col. Gen. Chervov by Col. V. Morozov: "To Build Bridges, Summing Up The First Round of Negotiations on Conventional Weapons", *Trud*, 12 April 1989, p. 3, in *FBIS-SU*, 20 April 1989, p. 1. This is largely a modernized version of the "Budapest Appeal" of June 1986 which advocated similar reductions, without the terminology of reasonable sufficiency and defensive structuring. Shevardnadze introduced the three-stage plan at the beginning of the CFE negotiations.

⁹⁷ It should be noted that NATO uses the term "sufficiency" in the CFE context, in order to place upper limits on the number of armaments retained by any one country. Sufficiency in this context is defined as no one country retaining more than 30 percent of the overall limits in main battle tanks, APCs, artillery pieces, combat aircraft, and combat helicopters. See the report on the Western position paper in *ACR*, 1989, pp. 407.D.27, 407.E.30.