

A ban on the production of weapons-grade fissionable material would be relatively easy to verify since a number of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards are already in place. Tamper-proof cameras and seals allow a form of remote on-site verification as they monitor the movement of nuclear materials. Such verification would be further simplified by a nuclear freeze which would allow the closure of some nuclear plants. Furthermore, there are only three plants in the US which currently manufacture nuclear warheads, and any activity at these sites would be 'immediately suspect'. Finally, the production of nuclear missiles and aircraft could be monitored by satellite, since the size, known location and transportation routes of production plants would all facilitate the detection of suspicious activity.

Any deployment of a new weapons system would be readily monitored using national technical means of verification. Thus, a comprehensive nuclear freeze would significantly improve the effectiveness of verification by requiring only that any deployment be detected; it would not be necessary to distinguish the number or category of weapons being deployed. Again the deployment of cruise missiles would be somewhat more difficult to verify, but their platforms are more readily distinguished and are thus easier to monitor.

It is concluded that obstacles to a verifiable nuclear freeze tend to be political rather than technical in nature. Absolute certainty is impossible, and "a more reasonable approach is to weigh the risks of violation of a freeze against the risks of the alternative: an expensive and destabilizing nuclear arms race which will increase the likelihood of nuclear war" (p. 266).