

## The Naval Manœuvres.

BY AN IMPERIAL OBSERVER.

*From the Army and Navy Magazine.*  
(Concluded.)

In any case the news that *Latona* carried was necessarily incomplete and of a kind rather to mislead Admiral Fitzroy as to his future course of action. For Admiral Dale not having realized that by the rules he now only commanded a phantom fleet, naturally led Admiral Fitzroy to expect effective co-operation from the B Fleet. Accordingly the A Fleet bore up gallantly to engage the two Blue Fleets, calculating on being sure to keep them occupied long enough to enable the B Fleet to engage them from the north whilst the action with the A Fleet on the south was still going on.

By twenty-two minutes past ten Admiral Seymour with his combined fleet opened fire upon Admiral Fitzroy, who promptly replied. About twenty minutes later Admiral Dale's fleet, having joined Admiral Fitzroy's, opened fire also. The action lasted for two hours from the time that Admiral Seymour had fired his first shot. At the end of that time he hauled down his signal for action, and claimed to have captured the whole of Admiral Fitzroy's fleet. This was simply on the ground of the rules already quoted. Assuming, as the umpires have now decided that he was correct in doing, that Admiral Dale's fleet was already either out of action or captured, he had only Admiral Fitzroy's to deal with, and according to the conventional strength assigned to the fleets, he was, allowing for absent vessels on both sides, in decided superiority to the A Fleet alone. The umpires' ruling follows necessarily upon the decision given on the earlier fight, and declares the A Fleet also to have been captured. It must, however, be noticed that in estimating the strength of the Blue Fleets for this action, no account is taken of the serious loss, or of the number of ships crippled, from which the Blue Fleets must in real warfare have suffered during their contest with Admiral Dale.

A few minor points may now be noticed as to the conditions under which the two engagements took place. The A Fleet might have arrived quicker upon the scene of action and, very possibly at least, have been in time to join in the earlier fight had not Admiral Fitzroy anticipated a different course of action on the part of Admiral Seymour. Fitzroy expected to meet either the combined Blue Fleets, or first the C Fleet, shortly afterwards supported by the D Fleet in St. George's Channel. Admiral Seymour had, however, calculated that this would

be what his enemies would wish for. In that case, in the wide opening of the Channel, it might have been possible for Admiral Fitzroy to engage the Blue Fleet with his cruisers, and taking advantage of the night slip past with his line of battleships and effect his junction with Admiral Dale. Therefore he decided, instead of intercepting Admiral Fitzroy in the St. George's Channel, to intercept Admiral Dale in the narrower North Channel. The event proved the soundness of his calculation. It may further be observed that Admiral Seymour's movement had to be carried out with some caution, because from the hostile port of Belfast he was liable to be seriously attacked by the enemy's torpedo-boats. As however the time when the attack must take place was pretty well known, the precautions which were taken against it proved adequate, and no damage is recorded as having been effected by the torpedoes. The scouting of the cruisers seems to have been remarkably effective on both sides.

There can be no doubt that the manœuvres have been remarkably interesting, at least as a story, from the short sharp nature of the campaign, and from the decisive and definite results that have been obtained, at least so far as Manœuvre Rules and Umpire decisions can determine. It is also clear that should any analogous incident occur in actual warfare, the course pursued by Admiral Dale will hardly be repeated. That is to say that, if there be two fleets which are together superior to an enemy's combined fleet, but find their junction intercepted by it in narrow seas, then the wise course for the fleet which first finds itself opposed to the intercepting enemy will not be to endeavour to force its way past. It will, on the contrary, avoid decisive action, keep the enemy under close observation, and, if it is pursued, draw the enemy out into more open water. At the same time it will use every means in its power to communicate with the approaching fleet of its own countrymen. If it succeeds in drawing out the enemy into open water, probably a fast cruiser will be able to communicate with the other fleet, as did *Latona*. If the narrow seas occur at a point like Gibraltar, probably communication being established by signal with that fortress will enable a cruisers to slip out thence in rear of the enemy. That at Gibraltar the course pursued by Admiral Dale would have been highly dangerous is all the more certain because, at present at all events at Gibraltar he would find no docks for the repair of such of his ships as had been damaged in the action.

On the other hand, the instruction afforded by the manœuvres is of this general kind. It is not an

object lesson of what is likely to take place, should we ever unhappily be engaged in war with the French. The Admiralty have very carefully and rightly in their avowed copy of certain relative positions of our own fleets and of fleets in French harbours, avoided either showing their own hand, or representing the actual situation on the French fleets. It is notorious that the French have not kept a large part of their fleet at Brest, and another large part in the Mediterranean. They have, on the contrary, accumulated by far the greater part of their naval power in the Mediterranean itself. They have nearly denuded Brest of men-of-war. Therefore, from the point of view of representing what might at least happen in the event of war, it would have been more interesting if either the fleet at Toulon had been proportionately increased, and that at Brest reduced, or if a station like Biserta, which is very likely to be a gathering point of French war vessels, had been chosen instead of Brest. Perhaps the policy which our fleets would under the actual circumstances of the case necessarily pursue, would be too clearly revealed if these conditions were to closely imitated. In any case, even as the manœuvres were conducted, so much depended on nice calculation of hours, such as fog and other causes might have easily upset, for us to have any occasion for alarm, because the Blue Fleets, which for the time represented the French, achieved an undoubted victory over the Red, which represented England.

## An Indian Prince's Pension.

THE VANISHING RUPEE.

The "vanishing rupee" was the cause of the appearance of a Hindoo Prince in the London Bankruptcy Court. S. Chath Singh told the Registrar that some years ago Lord Northbrook removed him from India, and liquidated his possessions into a pension, which was originally £42 a month. The Prince explained that year by year and month by month it was growing smaller and smaller. Four years ago it fell to 32£ a month; three years ago to £29 a month; last year to £26; and the last two months it was down to £22. It was no fault of his, and the India office should remedy it. The Prince has written the following epitome of his troubles:—"If I pray to editors of newspapers they think it is for the money for the article. If I ask solicitor, he wants five guineas in advance. If I ask the noble gentleman, they do not want the trouble for the justice. If I ask the Secretary of State of India, I get no answer. If I write a letter to the Accountant-General of India's office—no answer. If I pray to the noble lady to help me—no answer. I had nearly 3,000 copies and pamphlets published—no answer. I ask the Government if you did not take my country? You can keep my country. But give me my allowance money and value of the revenue of my estate in Chumba. I want £100 per month, then I can live like a gentleman should do.