to assemble a hundred thousand men for the purpose of a "demonstration." The law deems the assembly of such vast multitudes as illegal, from their serious tendency to disturb society. When a hundred thousand men are got together, no one can tell what they may do or not do. Such assemblages are not *meetings;* they are *mobs;* and all history tells us how dangerous mobs are. They are sure to contain a large proportion of the reckless and the worthless, who on such occasions are always ready for mischief, and likely to give one of those sudden impulses by which numerous masses of men are so easily led. No one can foresee what such mobs may do, and no one has a right to incur the risk, and put the public peace to such fearful peril. Some trifling provocation —some casual excitement, and this vast mob becomes a tremendous engine of mischief which may in a few hours produce consequences one sickens to contemplate. We who write, and those who read these lines, are old enough to remember the disastrous riots of Bristol, and have read of those of Birmingham; and we shall never forget the terrible pictures we have had put before us of the Lord George Gordon riots, when half London was in flames. All these terrible disturbances arose in the simplest possible way; merely by getting large masses of people together. There are myriads in all large cities who eagerly swarm to such assemblages in the *hope* of a disturbance, and eagerly seize any chance of creating one. Every one knows this, and therefore no one has a right to gather such multitudes together; and any one who does so is doing an act wilfully illegal. All this has been established within the last twenty years in the criminal courts of England and Ireland. It was established in the Chartist trials. It was established in the trials of the Irish agitators. It was established, above all in the case of O'Connell. (Vide *O'Connell* v. *Reg.*, 11 Cl. & Fin. 156). It is true, the indictment was held there too general, but there was no doubt as to the law. The offence for which he was tried, and of which he was convicted. was that of exciting public terror, and disturbing the public peace, by the assemblage of vast multitudes of men, and the indictment failed as a mere matter of pleading. His monster meetings were, it will be remembered. studiously peaceful. He studiously protested against any violence; in that respect far more cautious than Mr. Bright; who distinctly hints at it, as, at all events, a possible future measure, whereas the great Irish agitator always denounced it as criminal, and on that account he flattered himself that what he did was lawful; but it was not, and the House of Lords affirmed that it was not. The judgment was reversed upon grounds quite distinct from the merits, as we all know. The House of Lords never doubted that the offence committed *was* an offence against the law of this country; and since then, in *O'Connell's case*, it was not disputed, that to stir up the Queen's subjects to disaffection is an indictable offence. (*Reg.* v. *O'Conner*, 13 L. J., M. C., 33). If it were not so, it would be at the will of every popular agitator to keep this country constantly on the brink of a revolution, until one day, intentionally or unintentionally, *revolution came*, and overwhelmed the nation like a torrent. It will not do to live on the brink of a revolution, and the holding of monster meetings has been always the *beginning* of revolution. Vast assemblages of men are of no possible use except for the purpose of *threatening* revolution, and if they are allowed to continue *threatening* it, they will one day, by some accident, go a long way towards realizing these threats. That in this country they could ever succeed, of course, we do not believe; but they would produce an immense amount of disaster to the nation and to themselves. No doubt, there is no *intention* of producing this mischief. Probably all that is meant is to produce just so much of public alarm and disquietude as shall enforce the passing of a popular measure. But, then, that is just what is illegal and criminal. It is illegal to attempt to coerce or intimidate Parliament or the Government in that way. The lawful and constitutional way of shewing popular desire for a measure is by petition. If the people are agreed in its favour, there is the less need for meeting to discuss it, and a hundred thousand men never did meet for discussion. If they meet for demonstration, it is in effect for intimidation, and that is illegal. Indeed, popular intimidation is the beginning of revolution, and the worst kind of revolution—*mob* revolution—which means anarchy, dissolution of society, and universal ruin. Men have no right to provoke such peril, or dally with such danger. It matters not what their intentions may be; if they take measures calculated to produce such peril, they are legally responsible for their acts, whatever the results; and even though no ill results actually arise, they are legally liable for the illegality of their acts. It is the *peril* of such results which makes the illegality, not their actual occurrence. The offence is the *endangering* the public peace, not its actual destruction—its disturbance and disquietude by the presence of danger. The object, no doubt, is to *produce* that sense of danger, and that object is unlawful, and, in a legal and moral sense, it is criminal.—*Jurist.*

THE DUTIES OF CORONERS.

The death of Mr. Swann, a county coroner for Nottinghamshire, during the pendency of an inquiry into the circumstances attending the murder of Mr. Raynor at Carlton, has given rise to some remarks which affect the present condition of the law concerning coroner's inquests. The state of facts, we believe, is unique: we can find no precedent. The inquisition instituted by Mr. Swann was never brought to a finding. Could the Newark coroner, who was summoned to conduct the inquiry continue the proceedings, and take a verdict from the jury?

Now, the office of coroner is a judicial office, and one coroner can no more take up an