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The Reich, in fact, has not given birth to any international doctrine, but a national doctrine. Its form of socialism, which has won greater advantages for the working classes than that of any other country, has not crossed the frontier. Hitler himself has frequently said in his speeches that national socialism is not an export, and in my travels through Belgium, France, Holland, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia—I don't mention Poland and Yugoslavia because these have remained rebellious from the days of their occupation, nor Hungary nor Roumania, because I only know them superficially-I observed a great malcontent with German socialism. While communism is accepted without reserve, as some-thing of their own, by the masses which believe in it, the nominal Nazis of Belgium and Holland speak of a national socialism which is something apart, something sui generis. They dispute about fundamental points of the S.S. programme, even though they are almost all within its ranks, and in a certain way they put national separatism before the universalism of the Socialists. Even amongst those in the occupied countries most in contact with the Reich the belief exists deep down that the German Empire in Europe if it were created would mean that everybody would have to work for the Germans. This is an idea which is not without foundation when you consider the enormous racial pride of Germany, and its difficulty in adapting itself to the psychology of other nations. In one word, the idea which reigns in the occupied countries is that German occupation, if it were carried on into days of peace, might perhaps bring with it some material benefits—better organisation and better use of natural resources and money—but that all this would be for Germany's benefit.

Under these conditions people are only on the side of a Power when they believe in its eventual triumph. Those on its side in this manner often go much further than their masters, as, for example, in Norway, where Quisling has succeeded in making himself much more hated than the occupying army. The blame for many of the things which have occurred in the occupied countries is due to the collaborators of Germany, whose advice has been bad, and who have tried to be more German than the Germans. Germany has never heard a "No" from anyone till the lot of battle began to turn against her. The Germans, as a matter of fact, did not dislike this, for the German is a big child who gets drunk on the idea of his certain victory.

Germany has not believed in Victory.

The first surprise one receives on entering the Reich is this: that the German has not believed in victory. This explains the ease with which desertions have taken place from the Axis, and explains why Germany has to bear the whole brunt of the war. The German does not believe in victory and his allies were mostly enforced allies. In the days when the armies of the Reich seemed to be carrying everything before them, they took the German side in much the same way that a desperate gambler, with pretty well all his money gone, puts his last penny on a horse in winning vein. When Austria was annexed, when the Ruhr was reoccupied, and when the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was created, Germany trembled. I talked in those days with inhabitants of the frontier regions, and they gave me the impression of a man playing poker and putting all his money on to a straight flush. Though the opposite is said, Germany had no belief in the straight flush. The Germans declared war, without any doubt, in a spirit of revenge. They also entered the war to settle a situation which had been going on too long. Since national socialism had come into power there had been nothing but taxes and short commons, in the service of armaments. They also made war because of their desire to be stronger than everybody. Later on, German propaganda has been attacked abroad for its folly in creating the myth of German invincibility, to a point that the smallest reverse had an enormous importance which did not correspond to reality. The fact is, however, that the average German has to have something of this sort to believe in if he is to continue keeping going. Foreign propaganda was no more than the reflection of internal propaganda. That is why the Germans were always promised a blitzkrieg, because a short war was the only sort the German felt he could support. He lacked confidence in his own reserve powers because he felt a certain poverty and inferiority complex. The present German generation has not known real victory, and the recollection of 1918 still hangs upon them. The first triumph raised their pride to great heights, but the curve of German contentment began to decline with the entry of the United States into the war. The course of the last war is repeating itself too much for the public not to be aware of it and affected by it.

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