

(c) The crux of the problem at this time is nuclear weapons tests. It has become increasingly clear that, if the nuclear powers cannot resolve their differences over this issue, no real progress can be expected in the immensely more complex task of working out a system of general disarmament.

(d) The United States and Britain have, over the past year, agreed that on-site inspection is not necessary for atmospheric, underwater and outer space tests. Moreover, they have indicated a willingness to reduce to a minimum any requirement for on-site inspection in the field of underground tests. Some reference has been made in the Soviet press to the possibility of using the system of unmanned seismic stations ("black boxes") which was discussed at the recent Pugwash Conferences as a substitute for on-site inspection, but the scientists who presented this idea (including three Soviet scientists) themselves recognized that it would "substantially reduce the number of necessary on-site inspections" not eliminate the need for them.

(e) We do not deny that there may be risks involved in signing a test ban treaty – for both the Soviet Union and the Western nuclear powers. We have made plain in our statements to the U.N. that no such agreement is likely to meet all the preoccupations of the parties to it. What we do insist upon, however, is that the risks to national security which may be involved in signing a nuclear tests treaty should be weighed against the immensely greater risks which the international community as a whole continues to run so long as no agreement is reached.

(f) In the light of all these factors, we would again urge the Soviet Government, and Premier Khrushchev personally, to take the few remaining steps which seem necessary to achieve an acceptable compromise on the cessation of nuclear weapons tests. Agreement on a test ban would be of immense significance for it is the first move in the direction of disarmament which is psychologically the most important. There is every reason for believing that agreement could be achieved now, and we cannot believe that the Soviet Union will allow this opportunity to slip by.

3. Without mentioning Roberts' recent interview you might seek clarification of Khrushchev's comments on acceptability of retaining Western forces in Berlin under aegis of U.N. You might also attempt to obtain further comments on German problem generally.⁴²

4. At suitable opportunity you should express Canadian satisfaction at the lessening of tension in Cuba. Any comments you could elicit on Mikoyan-Castro talks would be useful as we have little hard information of the course of the conversations which have been subject of highly speculative but perhaps unreliable reports in Western press.

5. While expressing our desire to improve Canadian-Soviet relations you should impress on Khrushchev that in our opinion bilateral relations cannot be completely divorced from East-West relations generally. Therefore a substantial improvement in our relations can only be brought about by a general lessening in East-West tensions. Your comments along these lines might help to clarify the Soviet misinterpretation of our understanding of "relations" as revealed in your conversation with Lavrov (your telegram 815 November 12).⁴³

6. If Khrushchev raises subject of trade negotiations recently held in Moscow you should note that consultations were useful and that subject of renewing agreement in new year now under consideration by Canadian Government.

7. There would be no objection to your discussing proposed trip to Soviet sub-Arctic. A promise of Khrushchev's cooperation would probably enhance your chances of visiting areas which have been inaccessible to Westerners for a number of years.

⁴² Voir/See documents 197, 200, 202, 728, 733.

⁴³ Voir/See document 438.