

which a reference to Parliament would certainly never have sanctioned.

The importance of the possession of San Juan island, whether exaggerated or not, must depend upon the measure of value placed upon it. It is certainly not worth going to war about, and no reasonable man ever contemplated such a contingency; but rather than lose it in the way we have, I submit that it would have been more consistent with our dignity, and less humiliating to our pride, to have made the United States Government a present of the whole question at issue, than to have consented to set aside the Treaty, and refer to arbitration two alternative and subordinate propositions, not even alluded to in it, on conditions almost entailing defeat.

The Treaty of 1846 defined the north-west water boundary to be "a line drawn from the middle of the channel which separates the continent from Vancouver's Island southerly through the middle of the said channel and of Fuca Strait to the ocean."

The Government of that day has been blamed for not having appended a map or chart to the Treaty. It is a sufficient reply to this, that there was at that time no complete chart of the Straits in existence, and that the words of the Treaty supplied in themselves a perfect definition. They demanded not necessarily a *navigable ship channel* (any more than the land boundary demanded a road or pathway), but a *line of demarcation* through the middle of the *whole channel* separating the continent from Vancouver's Island. Such a line, including the free navigation of the whole channel to both parties, would fulfil every condition of this explicit Treaty, which either of the substituted passages, De Haro and Rosario, fails to do.¹

¹ *Vide* opinion of Sir Richard Pakenham, our representative in negotiating the Treaty of 1846:—"I deny that either can exactly fulfil the conditions