

*Supply—External Affairs*

to such a role in twentieth century development of national freedom represent one of the greatest perversions in history.

Then finally, Stalinism meant the use of communist parties in non-communist states as agents of Moscow policies. These parties I think have been shaken by the overthrow of their great god Stalin; but they are recovering from this shock and they are now beginning to rally with traditional submission—as so often in the past—to the new dictates from Moscow and to become its agents as before. Their attitude to this change that has taken place will be a conclusive test whether they have any claims to national allegiance or national status at all or whether they are merely, as they were formerly, the tools of Moscow for any purpose that Moscow may decide to follow.

Hence a question which has exercised us in the past is, I think, exercising us even more at the present time. The question to which I refer is this. Have the Moscow communist leaders abandoned the cult not only of personality, as they claim, but the cult of international revolution, of the violent overthrow of our system? They, of course, insist that there is no such cult, no such design, or no such danger. Khrushchev, Shepilov and the others, it is true, have admitted—indeed they have insisted—that the capitalist and the socialist-communist systems cannot be reconciled, that one or the other must go; and they are confident that it will not be the communist system that will go. But, they add, this can be done peacefully. As Mr. Khrushchev put it in the twentieth party congress in Moscow, and his words were repeated by other Soviet leaders on that occasion:

There is nothing more absurd than the fiction that people are forced to take the path of communism under pressure from without. We are confident that the ideas of communism will triumph and no "iron curtains" or barriers erected by the bourgeois reactionaries can halt their spread to more and more millions.

That is the fairy tale, namely that these things develop from within, peacefully and without force. The fact is, as we all know, that no single country in history has become communist by the declared will of its people. In every case force was used and force was decisive. Mr. Khrushchev really let the cat out of the bag last February when he wrote—and some of his colleagues repeated it at the last party congress—as follows:

Of course, in those countries where capitalism is still strong, where it has in its hands an enormous military-police apparatus, there the serious opposition of the reactionary forces is inevitable. There the transition to socialism will take place in conditions of sharp class, revolutionary struggle.

[Mr. Pearson.]

What this means, in plain English, is that communism will use force when it considers it necessary to do so, and if it can, in order to destroy parliamentary democracy and establish the dictatorship of the communist party. In effect, the new position in Moscow is exactly the same as it was when Stalin, some years ago, said that the communist parties would be quite happy to achieve power by parliamentary means, by peaceful means, but that they would use force if they had to and in any event they would achieve power peacefully for the same purposes as if they had achieved it by force.

A question arising out of this which concerns us in this country and in other countries, is this. Does this mean that Moscow is still willing and anxious to assist any and every foreign communist party in its revolutionary plans, in its determination to overthrow free parliamentary government? That, Mr. Chairman, seems to me to be a vital question, the test of Soviet sincerity. It is for them to demonstrate that they are not concerned now with international revolution. I do not expect—nor can any of us—that these people in Moscow and elsewhere should abandon their revolutionary slogans. That probably would be too much to hope for. But we can expect, and indeed we can insist as a test of good faith, that they show that in fact they are keeping out of our domestic affairs. We have no assurance on this score in this country or in other countries. Nor have we any reason to believe, changing to another aspect of Soviet policy, that they have abandoned or weakened in any respect what has been for some years now the primary objective of Soviet policy, the weakening and destruction of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO is still a major target for Soviet attack; that is still the greatest tribute to its value and strength. It certainly should counsel us to preserve that strength.

So far as the military side of this question is concerned it may well be, as has been indicated, that new developments both political and strategic may make a reassessment of NATO's plans and NATO's defence policies desirable. It may even make desirable some reassessment of plans and strategy to meet new circumstances. But that, I suggest, must not imply any weakening of NATO's deterrent and defensive forces.

Moreover, Mr. Chairman, I think it is important, indeed I think it is essential, that this reassessment and any changes which may result from it should be made inside the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and should be the result of collective discussion and collective agreement. Unilateral decisions, without such discussion or agreement,