

*Supply—External Affairs*

We must not, of course, forget that we were not in a position at Geneva or indeed elsewhere to impose that kind of settlement on a defeated enemy. And we must not forget either that we have no obligation to impose that kind of settlement on Korea by force. Therefore, it could only be done by agreement, and agreement, of course, has not been easy to obtain.

In seeking such an agreement to attain the objectives laid down by the United Nations, the United Nations and the republic of Korea delegations have worked closely together in friendly co-operation. They have not always, of course, seen eye to eye on means, but have been in agreement in regard to ends.

Such differences are, I suppose, inevitable in discussion between representatives of free governments, but I know the house will agree when I say, Mr. Chairman, that we should try to keep them to a minimum in the face of the common menace which confronts us all.

The communist delegations at the Korean conference spoke as one. They spoke in the same vein and indeed often in the same words in their accusations and attacks largely directed against the United States. I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that 90 per cent of the content of their speeches consisted of propaganda and polemics. We got the same distortions of recent developments in Korea to which we have been accustomed at the United Nations, and we got the same falsification of fact and of history. It was interesting to note that the dialectics and diatribes of the new communist delegations were just about the same as that of the old hands.

The delegates on the United Nations side, though anxious to get on with the business of negotiating a Korean settlement, have not allowed these unfounded accusations to go unanswered. To reply to the slanderous attacks and abusive propaganda which form such a depressing proportion of the communist speeches at meetings of this kind is a time-consuming and unpleasant task, but when the eyes of the world are focused on a conference it is a task which I think we cannot afford to forgo lest it should be supposed in any part of the world, especially in this case in the Asian part of the world, that silence may indicate some kind of consent.

Therefore, Mr. Chairman, in my own intervention in the general debate on the Korean question at Geneva I attempted on May 4 to follow the course which had already been laid down by others in dealing with some of these communist charges, and particularly I ventured to point out that, contrary to the assertions of Mr. Molotov, who took it

[Mr. Pearson.]

upon himself to speak for Asia, we in the west did understand, and fully accepted, the significance of what has been taking place in Asia over recent years, and that we were indeed sympathetic in the march of the peoples of Asia toward national freedom and greater human welfare.

I added, however, that the right to be free did not include the obligation to be communist, nor did "Asia for the Asians", which is a phrase Molotov and others had used, mean Asia for the cominform.

I also pointed out, Mr. Chairman, that our own national experience in Canada refuted completely the wild charges which were levelled by communist delegations to the effect that the people of the United States were either aggressive or imperialist in their outlook.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I should explain in a few words what the communist peace plan for Korea was as put forward at the Geneva conference. In principle it involved the repudiation of United Nations plans on which we had previously agreed, and if it had been carried into effect it would also have necessitated the exclusion of the United Nations as a belligerent from the substance and the supervision of the peace settlement. It would have required us on our side to accept the fact of United States and republic of Korea aggression, and of the charge that the United Nations in this matter had merely acted as the victim and the tool of United States imperialism.

Obviously any proposal based on these premises was not acceptable to the United Nations delegations. There were also other details which made this plan unacceptable.

The two governments of the republic of Korea and North Korea were to be considered on the same political, legal and moral level, and acceptance of this was to be recognized in an all-Korean commission with equal representation of the north and south, though the south in population is probably five or six times greater than the north. This all-Korean commission was to work out plans for all-Korean elections, free from outside supervision except—and this has been an additional proposal of the communists since I left Geneva—by what they call a neutral commission.

We are not quite clear about this neutral commission but it is certainly to be divorced from the United Nations. Its function is to assist the all-Korean commission, and its composition would presumably exclude all