

We do know of course that the world situation is dangerous — all the more so because any use of force for any aggressive purpose by a superpower is bound to adversely affect the climate of international relations. And of course, just at the turn of the year, we saw the most unfortunate and illegal Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which has poisoned the international atmosphere for the whole of this year. I think, though that despite the fact that this unfortunate event not only has occurred but is continuing, despite the fact that we have had to take a series of measures directed at making the Soviets at least pay a price for this invasion, such as the Olympic boycott and such as the embargo on grains and the limitation of our commerce, the cutting off of many visits, including all official visits to the Soviet Union, and many other things which I could mention. Although we have had to take all of these steps — and I think they were very important to be taken — this does not imply that *détente* has wholly gone. But in my view, and in that of the government, *détente* rests on a firm foundation of deterrence. One of the reasons that we can have *détente* is that we are militarily prepared, and in the last week I said — and I received some criticism for this — that we are not likely to have a war in Europe. That is extremely unlikely. It is not because I believe that the Soviet Union is incapable of launching such a war or in some circumstances is unwilling. But we are sufficiently well prepared, through NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and in other ways in Europe, that war there is most unlikely. It is in the context of a strong deterrence that I believe we are able still to speak about and hope for *détente*.

Whatever the state of *détente*, though, East and West, in fact all countries, have a common interest in limiting the spread of arms and in reducing stockpiles and expenditures on arms, particularly nuclear arms. There has been in the past year some strengthening of NATO forces through the modernization of theatre nuclear weapons as they are called in Europe.

I know that not everyone here will be or is happy about that. In fact, I received a copy of your telegram to the then Secretary of State for External Affairs protesting this move some months ago. I must say that in my view, though, this modernization of weapons, and the modernization of weapons which Canada is undergoing, is fully justifiable. It is at a kind of threshold level of protection. In the case of those nuclear weapons, they are the same kind of nuclear weapons which the other side possesses and which they are not likely to give up unless there is an equal bargain to be struck on our side. If we don't have something to bargain with, there is no bargain.

Three foundations of peace

The government is convinced that real security rests on a three-cornered foundation. First, there is the foundation of deterrence — the capacity to deter war and, if deterrence fails, to defend ourselves. But the second element is equally important and it is about that I really want to talk this evening. That is arms control. I wanted to set the foundation of deterrence because I believe that it is on this that everything else can be built. But I don't think that it is nearly enough. The second theme of arms control is equally important. The third element of the foundation of peace are mechanisms and arrangements for the peaceful settlement of disputes. Dispute settlement is not at the same level of sophistication in the world, unfortunately, as it is within our states where we have courts that make decisions. In the world, where we have courts nations are not always willing to refer cases to them. The limitations of course are