

purpose, as I have just said, is wider than our own country, wider than our Commonwealth. It encompasses the family of man, and its full recognition should be the basis of international relations on this small and crowded planet. But the contemporary world gives little evidence that such a basis is likely to get general acceptance in the immediate future.

We had a vision of what might be done at San Francisco in 1945. That vision soon disappeared. And the cold war came and destroyed the hope that the United Nations would soon ensure freedom, fraternity and security for all men. As a second best, you remember, we formed a regional coalition spanning the Atlantic Ocean - a coalition through which member states could work together for political co-operation and collective defence. This was another postwar dream, this Atlantic dream - the building of an Atlantic community of inter-dependent states willing to pool their sovereignty in the interests of their security and their progress.

We ask ourselves why has NATO not realized more fully these hopes and these aspirations. Well, I might mention one or two reasons - there are many - for this. NATO concentrated on the single, if vitally-important, task, of collective military defence. It was not able to take effective measures for collective political action. National decisions were rarely subordinated to collective decisions, or national policy to collective policy. The United States, whose power dominated the alliance, largely determined the strategy and policy on which collective defence was based. The other members, it should be added, would probably not have acted differently if they had had the same super-power.

France, in due course, repudiated the whole ideal of collective security, falling back on the old and, as I believe, discredited, doctrine of national defence by national action - co-ordinated, if you like, in a military alliance, but with national sovereignty unimpaired. There are governments that still think that nationalism is not only sacred, which it is, but is sufficient, which it is not, and that national problems can be solved within purely national terms of reference. The lessons of history are depressing because they are usually learned too late, even by those who have suffered most from the failure so to learn.

There are other reasons for NATO's inability to realize its full collective potential. One of these, paradoxically, is its success in helping to lessen the fear of an attack on Western Europe. This reduction of tension and fear is not only a tribute to NATO, it's a danger for NATO. After all, fear was the father of the North Atlantic Treaty. And now, with the European member states stronger and more confident, with the Eastern European members of the Warsaw Pact more independent, the Soviet supremacy in the Communist world challenged by a bitterly hostile Peking, collective security, though essential as ever, has lost some of its immediate urgency. Fear of attack has lessened so we may feel that it is safe to relax.

The European -- indeed, the whole world -- situation has become fluid. The polarization of all power between the U.S.S.R., determining the policy of the Communist world, and the U.S.A., dominating that of the democracies, has been altered on the Communist side by Peking and on the Atlantic side by Paris, which