

parties to draft the Multilateral Agreement so as to confirm and strengthen the bias of the September 2000 accord.

The second priority is to create agency for nuclear safety and environmental protection in the Russian Federation. Conditionality aims to colonize the future to the degree possible. For disposition this means seeing to it now that it's guarded against adversity and moreover is made a success in a period that could be measured in decades. The principal colonial agent of the donor countries and the Russian Federation together should be an MMC. For the Corporation first to be established and then to succeed in the ensuing years, a Multilateral Agreement would have to provide substantial reassurance to the Russian people as well as the Russian Government.

There is no need to add to what's been said about contravention and agency. More interesting is the larger perspective which emerges from an analysis of disposition that's keyed to conditionality. As the puzzle comes together, the underlying theme turns out not to be international security as conventionally understood, for example irreversible nuclear disarmament. This is the distant goal, but the real business of achieving it lies in cooperation and conflict among cultures which treat civil nuclear affairs differently. In its fundamentals, the strategic interaction which makes for disposition of excess Russian WGPu is one of mutual enculturation.

Although there have been indications otherwise, this study has thus far stressed the enculturation of Russia according to the standards of a nuclear-safety club from which it stands apart. The need for agency to transfer standards, practices, and shared meaning to Russia from elsewhere has been a main theme. So also has the Russian desire for clubworthiness. And yet it's also become evident that if best nuclear safety and environmental practices are to be applied in Russian circumstances, these practices will themselves have to be amended. Not only do Russians have something to learn about nuclear responsibility from G-8 and other countries, but the latter have something to learn from an encounter with Russian realities in constructing an approach to disposition that works in the long haul. Together, the participants in disposition can do more than live according to the by-laws of the club. They can improve the club's standards and practices.

The disposition of Russian weapon-grade plutonium offers an opportunity to bring forward new and improved means of international security. We should not settle for less in a Multilateral Agreement. We need a disposition programme that's built to last.