the report not only in terms of past events, but also in terms of the "next" Rwanda. He suggested that recent action in Afghanistan is evidence that the international community has a vested interest in contributing to long-term, preventive action. He also reiterated that ICISS was very much a response to Security Council ineptitude in a variety of situations. In fact, he suggested, one of the strengths of ICISS is that, like the Brundtland Commission, ICISS was demanddriven, "rather than an idea looking for consumers." It is partly for this reason that the report has been welcomed in political circles, and why he predicts that "The Responsibility to Protect" will be mainstreamed in the next four or five years. While he agreed with the previous speakers that the Government of Canada has an important role to play in this process, he urged non-governmental organizations, academia and the media to play a much more active role in promoting its ideas. History demonstrates that changed behaviour requires a changed way of thinking. By spreading the message that "sovereignty is not the enemy of human rights — it's actually a precondition of human rights," substantive change can be brought about.

Gareth Evans, Co-Chair of the Commission, now President of the International Crisis Group, and a former Australian foreign minister, discussed by videoconference the content of the report. He reiterated the moral imperative of providing protection, noting in particular that while the international community may share increasingly common values, it still suffers from the lack of a common framework for action. ICISS hoped to remedy the situation by setting three pragmatic goals: to generate an intellectually robust but practical report; to provide recommendations not likely to be rejected out of hand by any player; and to ensure that these recommendations have practical potential for motivating state action. The report emphasizes that the interventionsovereignty debate has taken place in the context of evolving norms of conduct, in which there is an increasingly widespread acceptance of the premise that state sovereignty implies not only rights, but also responsibility. Embedded in this emerging conception of sovereignty as responsibility is the further premise that if a government abandons its citizens or proves incapable of protecting them, its sovereignty would yield to the responsibility of the larger international community. Evans noted that the concept of a responsibility to protect resonates with the post-war notion of human rights, the emerging concept of human security, and with the norms underlying numerous international treaties and practices designed to protect the individual. Framing the debate to make clear the dual responsibility of sovereignty, however, offers three advantages: it begins with an acknowledgement of the importance of the state, it shifts the perspective of debate to that of the victim, and it enables the discussion of "protection" as not only reaction, but also prevention and rebuilding.

Equally important as the change in terminology are the report's six criteria for military intervention when reaction does become necessary. These criteria provide a framework for whether, when and how to intervene. The "threshold" criteria, for example, limits military intervention for human protection to two (actual or apprehended) circumstances of "just cause": large-scale loss of human life; or large-scale ethnic cleansing, including killing, forced expulsion, terror and rape. Should intervention be warranted, the "precautionary" or "prudential" criteria come into play. These include right intention, last resort, proportional means and reasonable prospects. Finally, the "right authority" criteria stipulates that there is no more appropriate body than the UN Security Council to authorize military intervention. The report supports this stipulation with a call for further Security Council reform, suggesting that the question is not one of finding an alternative, but of ensuring that the council is able to act