NGO components that DHA has no intention of taking over the roles that those components feel are rightfully theirs, and thus will be more open to allowing DHA to fulfil its purely coordination role.

Returning to an earlier observation that DHA had not been given the power to command coordination. There is no indication that the GA is prepared to legislate such power to DHA in the short or medium term. Rather, it is incumbent upon DHA to demonstrate to the agencies that it is coordinating, that they do not have designs on the program roles of those agencies. In this way, those agencies will be prepared to delegate at least a portion of their sovereignty so as to allow neutral central leadership. Over time this will become established practice so that DHA will be in the position to 'assign' particular tasks or regions to various agencies who will acquiesce for the greater good. Such an evolution need not be dreaming in technicolour if DHA handles its mandate with diplomacy, neutrality, and studied professionalism with no hint of expansionism.

With time it may well become apparent and acceptable to the larger humanitarian players that DHA be given powers to coordinate by command.

Humanitarian intervention must of course not be limited to the here and now. There must be constant forward planning, particularly in situations like Rwanda where it appears that prior traditional development programs were not sufficient to avoid a cataclysm. This is not to ignore the political and military components of the Rwandan tragedy and this coming together or coordination is discussed elsewhere.

However, within the humanitarian and development community, it appears logical that DHA in an extension of its coordination role in humanitarian assistance, play a similar role in bringing together the larger humanitarian-development community to assess the past and reassess plans for the future. The mandated larger focus of DHA should extend to an assessment of the scope of the problem so that in the Rwanda situations for example, that the Great Lakes grouping of Burundi, Zaire, Uganda, and Tanzania are seen as integral to the discussion and the solutions.

Subsequently, DHA is admirably placed to initiate the liaison with the other international sectors such as the political and the military. Again this will be dealt with in Chapter 7. Throughout this, DHA and the rest of the humanitarian community will have the task of advocating for the victims of disasters and underdevelopment.

In conclusion, the humanitarian response to the Rwandan crisis was fast and relatively well orchestrated amongst both UN agencies and with nongovernmental humanitarian organizations. There were some real successes and just as promisingly, many in the humanitarian community are actively identifying and setting about to correct the failures. The present confusion on how to address the humanitarian dilemmas of the refugee camps in Zaire, and Rwandan reconstruction, does not detract from those initial successes.