


in Congo and Zaire).⁵ Obviously, the utility of military spending alone as an early warning indicator is limited, but the high Rwandan figure for 1993 does in retrospect highlight a potential crisis, even if at the time it would have been regarded as an incipient civil war rather than the prelude to a genocide.⁶

Figure 29 contrasts the military and social expenditure burden for Central African states. In all but two cases, the Congo and Gabon (not listed), military expenditures are less than \$15 per capita. In Gabon they represented \$99 per capita in 1993 (compared with combined health and education spending of about \$300), and although military spending might have dropped to below \$100 per capita by the mid-1990s, it remains considerably higher per capita than that of its neighbours. Its geographic situation, bordering



⁵ Declines are suggested by figures in ACDA, *WMEAT 1995*. In the case of the Congo, French military assistance (which represented a large proportion of total military expenditures) was also cut drastically in 1994.

⁶ For background on the Rwanda situation see Joint Evaluation of Emergency Assistance to Rwanda, *The International Response to Conflict and Genocide: Lessons from the Rwanda Experience*, vols. 1 ("Historical Perspective: Some Explanatory Factors") and 2 ("Early Warning and Conflict Management") (Copenhagen: Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1996).