

(Mr. Tóth, Hungary)

chemical weapons convention as early as possible, and led to the creation of the favourable atmosphere in which the negotiations are now progressing. The Hungarian delegation cannot but welcome the plans to intensify the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, allocating as much time as possible for substantive work in order to meet the objective adopted in the new mandate of the Committee. We appreciate the efforts made by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Batsanov, seeking to find additional time for negotiations without the intention of interfering with other no less important events of multilateral disarmament. We do believe that some kind of activity, apart from a full session of the Committee, is possible even during periods coinciding with the work of other disarmament forums. In this regard, consideration might also be given to making good use of the presence at the United Nations General Assembly of high-level political decision makers. Their gathering in New York could be exploited for giving additional political support or impetus to the CW negotiations.

The report of the Conference on Disarmament to be submitted to the United Nations General Assembly later this fall will reflect the results achieved so far in the CW negotiations. The achievements will duly represent the current state of affairs in the negotiations and will - in a way - also indicate the fields requiring further work for concluding the CW convention. One such field is of course verification which, by nature, is one of the crucial elements of any arms control or disarmament agreement. During this year's session important new approaches have been injected into the work on the verification regime to be applied to activities not prohibited under the convention. We attach equal importance to the fact that after a period of stalling, substantive discussion in the framework of the Ad Hoc Committee was resumed on the other element of the future verification system, namely, challenge inspection. The latter was substantiated not least by new ideas presented by a number of delegations giving ample material to work on with the aim of resolving the issue. The intensification of work on the verification system to be created under article VI of the draft convention was a result of the common recognition that existing provisions on the verification of activities not prohibited under the convention are far from satisfactory. We welcome the new approaches aiming to integrate the major and most relevant part of the international chemical industry in a more comprehensive system of verification. They all appear to seek some sort of solution to eliminate existing loopholes. It is also encouraging that the chemical industry is ready to provide access to all of its facilities for the main purposes of verification.

When we attempt to patch up the holes of the safety net identified with the verification system we should not overlook the imperfections that exist elsewhere. I would like to refer to the schedules of chemicals that are to play a fundamental part in conducting inspections. It is obvious that the contents of the schedules will determine to a large extent the scope of any inspection to be carried out in the future. Now, for example, as we look at schedule 1, listing chemicals known to be chemical weapons, we may have to