

cession to do." Now, this looks very plausible, but like many other plausible things requires only to be looked into, to have its sophistry detected. The whole force of this proposition lies in an omission, or, as appears by that omission, a misapprehension of the concession made in the Remarks; and in consequence of this, coming to the conclusion without settling the premises. Now this important omission is only the unimportant particle "for" which here, however, will stand for the whole sentence, "*with a view to be kept temperate.*"

In considering the clause, I shall put out of view the obvious objection to it as it stands, that there *may* be things which a christian may recommend to his neighbour, and which peculiar circumstances render inexpedient or unlawful for himself to do; and this being premised, we shall find that a very different sense is given to the clause by reading it, (as it clearly should be read, since this is the point in question,) "What it is inconsistent with his christian profession to do *for* himself, &c." Now, though I should concede that whatever a christian cannot do himself, he can neither teach his neighbour to do; yet this clearly has no connexion with the proposition, that what it may not be permissible for a christian to do *for* himself, it yet may be permissible for him to do *for* his neighbour.

Again, the clause makes no distinction between two very different things, viz.: signing for one's *own* good, and signing for the good of one's *neighbour*. Both these motives may operate in different individuals, but the latter alone concerns the christian. The Reply takes both these separate questions as included in the one, which in my previous remarks I conceded; and under the erroneous judgement of having proved the premises, it proceeds to what it supposes the inevitable conclusion.

To see the sophistry here concealed it will be necessary to take the clause to pieces, and first, what is the "what" that "is inconsistent"? It is signing the temperance pledge; but to say that signing the temperance pledge is inconsistent, &c. is begging the question, and taking for proved the very thing for which proof is required. The real question is, why is signing the temperance pledge inconsistent? To shew that it is, is not my business; I hope to shew that it is *not* inconsistent with Christian profession, and,

Firstly—The Reply seems to take for granted that the same reason must govern the christian in signing, whether he sign for his own sake or for the sake of others. Whoever supposes this, is egregiously in error; and I fear this is a point on which many well meaning christians have stum-

bled. Let us see what is the reason why he need not join on his *own* account; clearly that he feels the necessity laid upon him of doing God's will as contained in his word, which prohibits all excess; he is pledged to God. But how can this reason, which is all powerful in his own case, be made applicable to the case of a man who does not feel his obligation; who is not pledged to God? If the reason were the same in both cases, there would be no need of temperance societies, for all would be christians, and all would avoid intemperance. The "*reason*," therefore, that guides a christian in his own case, is not "*the same*" with that which actuates him in the case of his neighbour.

Secondly—What it makes the signing inconsistent, &c.; it clearly cannot be the mere act of signing. There can be no unlawfulness in a christian signing his name to a pledge abstractedly; the unlawfulness must depend upon the motive with which it is done, or the consequence which results. Now the motive is different in regard to the signing of the christian for himself, and his signing on account of his neighbour, as different as true christianity is from irreligion; therefore, admitting it were unlawful for the christian to sign with a view to keep himself temperate, it will by no means follow that he should not sign to make his neighbour so, or rather, there is no motive to induce a christian to join for himself, since he has a much more authoritative pledge; while there is a strong motive in the case of his neighbour, the preserving him from a vice to which his want of christian principle exposes him.—Therefore, as the motives are diametrically different in the two cases, the "unlawfulness" of the one case cannot form a criterion of the unlawfulness of the other, so far as they are concerned.

Now let us look whether the unlawfulness consists in the consequence following a christian's signing a temperance pledge. The only possible objection raised on this point must be the same that I endeavoured to combat in my former paper, but which I shall state again; It is, that by signing he leads others to think that he attributes more to the having the name pledged to a society of men, or publicly in the sight of men, than he does to the pledge to God; and, therefore, leads them to believe they may neglect or overlook God's aid in their attempts at reformation, by which means they are left irreligious, although possibly reclaimed from intemperance. Now, it might be sufficient in answer to say, that the christian cannot govern his conduct by the view taken of it by irreligious people; and, consequently, that if he is right himself in the sight of

God; if he signs solely with a view to doing good, and in reliance on and with prayer to God to bless his action to the benefit of his neighbour, he is clearly free from fault. But how can it be shewn that irreligious people will take this view? Put a case,—A man, known to be a true christian, and consequently a temperate man, publicly signs the pledge: the question is asked by the irreligious, why? what need? They must say, he cannot join for himself: for whom then? for his neighbour. What! forego his pleasure for men that care not about him? this is strange. What can be his inducement? It cannot be love of praise, for "that way" is evil spoken of: what can it be then? It must be because he considers it his duty in the sight of God. Will God not thereby be glorified, and will this be considered as tending to draw men away from God? I think not. As well might a christian physician be blamed for administering medicine to an infidel patient, because, although he himself may ask God's blessing on it, he does not insist on the patient's believing that it is that that will cure him. I therefore believe sufficient has been advanced to exonerate a christian from any consequences attending his signing, as far as himself is concerned.

Having, I trust satisfactorily, shown that a christian may join (and it will of course then follow from considerations to be subsequently urged, that he should join,) a Temperance Society, there is no need of dividing the persons who are to be objects of his attention into christians, real or nominal, heathens, or infidels. The motive that will guide him is the same towards all, viz. *the force of his example over others*; but with the view of meeting more fully the remarks of the Reply, let us now examine what the effect is of asking an intemperate man to sign the pledge, which, it must be admitted, is very often done without first preaching to him the Gospel, or explaining to him that God has any thing to do with it.

He will consider himself pledged to abstain 1stly, by feelings of honor; 2dly, by fear of reproach or of ridicule; 3dly, by some degree of fear of the consequences of intemperance, either in this world or the next. It is admitted that none of these motives belong to the Gospel; let us then consider the lawfulness of Christian's using them.

Now it is necessary to premise that all intemperate men are either irreligious, or very deficient in faith. First, then, of the irreligious. It is quite plain that to attempt to convince them by exhibiting the truths of the Gospel, is like throwing pearls to swine; their hearts are not able