distance of objects rather under than over what it really is.

Let us, finally, add a last detail, which has its value, viz., that when aming with the elevating handle, there is no longer a quostion as to smoke, whether coming from one's own guns or from those of the enemy,

hindering the operations or not.

"The following objection may here be made, however, viz, that aiming by means of the elevating screw can never be so ac curate as aiming in the regular manner by the tangent scale. It may, however, be met by this answer, that the errors which result from this method of proceeding will always be notably less than those which the captain will make in judging the distance of the object to be fired at by the eye. The use of the handle of the elevating screw can alone be depended on for regulating distances."

The foregoing is the method employed in the Prussian Artillery at the commencement of 1873. There is nothing to show that any other method has subsequently been adopted. "At this moment, perhaps," says the Invalide Russe, from which we have taken the foregoing information, "it is a que tion whether some new method may not have been found, for in the Prussian Army the motto is "nunquam dormio." Every one is constantly occupied in busily searching for new methods of fighting, with a view o the

battles of the future."

The Invalide Russe has lately published a second article, the author of which points out that this method of adjusting the elevation by means of the clevating screw alone is known in Russia. In an article inserted into the Russian Journal of Artillery (No. 1 1873), it is proposed to alter the elevating screw of the cannons de 4, and to make divisions on the head of the exterior screw, so that one can see exactly what fraction of a turn the screw has made. The author of the article has calculated the relationarising between the exact amount of clevation or depression given by the turn of the screw, and the consequent difference in elevation or range.

## TRIAL OF MARSHAL BAZAINE

From Broad Arrow 11th Oct.

The long-expected trial of Marshal Bazaine was commenced in the Trianon at Versailles on Monday last, the 6th instant. The number of witnesses summoned to give evidence for the prosecution is 272, of whom 129 are military witnesses, and 143 civil : amongst them mine women. Tha military witnesses are composed of two marshals-Gonrobert and Lebourf, 17 generals, 12 colonels, 11 lieutenant colonels, 20 majors, 23 captains, 3 lieutenants, and 5 sublieutenants, a number of soldiers, &c. The neutenants, a number of soldiers, &c. The most conspicuous amongst the civil witnesses are General Leflo. French ambassador at St. Petersburg, and four members of the National Assembly, visi, M. Jules Farrier M. Combier, and M. Ramean. The witnesses for the defence are expected to number 70 or 75. The Journal de Paris states that no less than 663 places were demanded by 10presentatives of the French and offerign press, and that the building would not per mit of accommodation being given to more than 80. It was therefore settled to confide the duty of reporting the proceedings to official shorthand writers, who would every two hours communicate an abridged report to those representatives of the press whom it would be impossible to admit into the hall. The marshal, whose fate is at length to be decided, was removed from his prison

in the Avenue de Picardie at Versailles to the Trianon on the 26th or 27th ultimo.

The court was opened at a quarter past twelve on Monday under the presidency of General the Duc d'Aumale. The marshal having been brought into court, the order for his trial and the names of the officers sitting as judges, were read. The marshal wore his uniform and the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honour. He was seated in an armchair, having his council by his side, among whom are Maitre Lachaud, and his son, and to assist them in military détails Colonel Villette, of the Staff.

At the request of the president, the accused stated his Christian and surnames, his profession, rank, &c. The names of the witnesses were then called over, of whom very few were absent. The names of Jules Favre, Regnier, and Forest Guard Scalabrino created some sensation among the public. After this the sitting was suspended for a short time. On resuming the president ordered that a statement of Marshal Bazaine's services since the beginning of his military career should be read, as well as the different distinctions conferred upon him, and the number of wounds he had received.

The report of the committee of inquiry into the capitulation of Metz, pursuant to which the marshal was ordered, to appear before a court mertial, was then read, but was very indistinctly heard in consequence of being delivered with a weak voice. This document, which has not been published by the Journal Official with the other reports relating to the same affair, is rendered nearly useless by the lengthy report of General Riviere, which conclueds against the marshal. The accused listened attentively without betraying any emotion.

After the reading of the acte d'accusation, the clark of the court read the order to institute, proceedings, social, the merchel dated the 9th of May, 1872, and signed by General Cissey, the Minister of War. This order states that there are good grounds for the capitulation of the army and the surrender of Metz.

The reading of General Riviere's report commenced at 3 p. m. It recalls the plans of campaign proposed with the object of carrying on the war against Germany, gives a sketch of the battle of Forbach on the 6th of August, laying especial stress upon the responsibility assumed by Marshal Bazaine in not having gone to the assistance of Gen eral Frossard, who was attacked by superior forces. The report, in continuation points out the responsibility of the marshal in the events which followed his appointment to the chief command of the army of the Rhine on th 12th of August, and partially explains the errors committed by the marshal, who sought to escape from the control of the Emperor, though the latter still remained with the army. It also alludes the mistakes made by the marshal up to the 16th of August, and maintains that he was never desirous of leaving Metz.

The sitting was then brought to an end.

On Tusday the Duc d'Aumale, the president of the court marial, entered the hall at twenty minutes past twelve, followed by the other members of the court. He directed that Marshal Bazaine should be brought into court, and the marshal was accordingly ushered id. Several witnesses who belong to the annexed provinces being absent, diplomatic measures are being taken to facili-

tate their attendance. These and several matters of form having been disposed of the clerk resumed the reading of General Riviiere's report, which now entered upon one of the most important points of the indictment, already mentioned in the portion read yesterdey—viz, that Marshal Bazaine stopped his advance after the battle of Rezonville, fought on the 16th of August, alleging as a reason that he was short of ammunition and provisions. This matter is minutely examined by the report, and Gene ral Riviere summarises his opinion upon it as follows: -On the evening of the 16th of August, the marshal had provisions sufficient for the 17th and 18th and part of the 19th of August. Besides, there were the rest of the provision trains at hand, which could have joined him on the morning of the 17th, and there were provisious in readiness at Verdun and along the route. It would be strange that, under such circumstances, the commander in chief should believe such a scarcity to exist as to compel him to retreat, and in fact he did not believe it. He admitted this in his examination, and attributed to clerical errors the assertions of his despatch on the subject of the insufficient supply of provisions. "In my idea," he said, "it was not that the provisions ran short, but that they should have been distributed, in such a manner as to make each man carry two or three days rations in his haversack, and thus relieve us of our immense train. desphis," continues General Riviere, "the question simply concerns the difficulty of distributing the provisions, but this difficulty was not insurmountable. By giving orders on the evening of the 16th instant, the convoy assembled at Ban Saint Martin could easily have made the twelve kilometres between Metz and the plateaxu, and the distribution could have been made on the morning of the 17th.

The report proceeds to examine the murshal's conductat the battle of St. Private of the Isth of August. It describes the position of his army on that day, and lays stress on the capital importance of defending the ground occupied by his right wing near the village of St. Privat, to the rear of which is situated the counter-fort of Ist. Quentin. This position commanded the sole outlet towards the plateau of St. Quentin and its possession was essential towards the marshal to resume his march northwards. These strategical considerations chust have been evident to an officer of the marshal sexperience; and if nothing in his arrangements manifested the resolution to defend a outrance the position occupied by his right, how can his conduct be explained exceptiby the conclusion, at which he had already arrived, not to leave Met ?

The report shows how the enemy's attacks, which commenced at eleven a.m., continued throughout the day, and increased in violence on the marshal's sight.

Three German army corps, numbering altogether 90,000 men with 280 gins; were massed against the 6th Corps, which consisted only of 26,000 men with 78 guns insufficiently served with ammunition and utterly destitute of mitrailleuses, although the ground was particularly favourable for the employment of that arm.

Marshal Carobett's resistance was heroio, and would have been effectual had the guard and the reserve artiflery been sent to his aid in time. But in ordor to seize the favourable moment, the commander in chief, who alone had the power to dispose of the reserve, should have been in a position to know how matters stood. And how could this be the case, when Marshal Baraine only