

is personal, for reason is without meaning to us except as an attribute of personality. Therefore, the nature of the moral law itself enables us to conclude that the Absolute is rational, hence, ethical and personal.\*

Again, the personality of the Absolute is made more evident by another psychological aspect of man's moral consciousness. Prof. James has given an interesting analysis of the self in its moral and religious phases. In speaking of what he calls the "social me," he shows that we are constantly asking how others think of us. There is a desire to be approved by our fellows. We carry on a constant self-judgment by imagining how we look in the eyes of others. But this desire for approval from some near and intimate companion is so vast that it becomes itself a kind of religion. This companion whose approval is sought, is idealized and magnified till he becomes the "great Companion," "God," "the absolute Mind." This relation between these two selves constitutes the moral relation; this moral relation is the restraint of one personality or self over another, and is the expression of the harmony or disharmony in their desires.† If this psychological analysis of our consciousness may be made a guide in our interpretation of the nature of the absolute ground of moral obligation, we again reach the conclusion that this Absolute is personal.

Once more: many are willing to ground the moral law in the universe, but find it necessary to stop short of a personal God, and put in his place a moral world order. Fichte did this in his attempt to escape what he considered a crude anthropomorphism in attributing personality to the Absolute. This means no personal God, but a moral world order. In reply, we may say with Lotze that this moral world order can not be regarded apart from the world—an unjustifiable abstraction. If this moral world order is simply order, *i.e.*, relations of that which exists, it can never be that which orders, never present itself as one who claims my personal allegiance. The moral consciousness does recognize this "great companion," and a true philosophy must not overlook this fact. Consequently, Fichte's moral world order is only a half-way house to the recognition

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\*Murray, *Handbook of Ethics*, 358 ff.

†W. James, *the Principles of Psychology*, I., 315, 316.