

but a neutrality, as far as it concerned the Western Allies, "to be characterised by the most complete and sincere benevolence".

This apparent treachery on the part of the Greek King aroused the keenest resentment among the Allies. Before condemning him unreservedly, however, it might be well to examine briefly the situation from the standpoint of the Greeks. In the first place King Constantine and his military advisers undoubtedly had definite, first-hand information as to the forces at the disposal of the Central powers for the invasion of Serbia and foresaw the futility of the Allied effort to stem the invasion. Also it is more than probable that they received quite definite instructions as to what would happen if Greece threw in her lot with the Entente. Finally, the original understanding that led to the landing at Salonika called for at least 150,000 troops, and this number was not forthcoming. Only about 40,000 troops had arrived by the end of October and the number had not reached the required total until two months later. While the course followed at that time by Greece may not have been actuated by the lofty ideals that led Belgium to her martyrdom, it cannot be denied that on the basis of immediate safety and self-interest she had some pretext for hesitation in casting in her lot with the Allies.

After the withdrawal of the troops southward, the work of fortifying Salonika and preparing it for use as a base for future operations was pushed forward with feverish energy. Although the original purpose of the expedition had disappeared there seemed no disposition in the Allied capitals to withdraw from Greece. To have done so would have given the Central powers an opportunity of obtaining a splendid naval base on the Aegæan. Moreover, the strain of immediate contact of Greece with Bulgaria might have been too great for the neutrality of the former. If, however, the Allies were to remain, Salonika must be made impregnable. Indeed, for some time during the early part of 1916, there was very serious apprehension that the Central powers would extend their operations farther southward and endeavour to drive out the Allies. Fortunately the danger passed away. Once Germany and Austria secured complete control of the trunk line from Belgrade to Constantinople they seemed to lose interest in the campaign and Bulgaria was hardly in a position to undertake the task without assistance.

The defences of Salonika were practically complete by the end of December. The following months saw the constant arrival of fresh troops, distinguished not merely for their numbers but also for the variety of their nationality, every one of the Allies contributing its quota. One of the most remarkable contingents arrived in April. It consisted of the entire remaining Serbian Army which after being driven