

exercised pressure on Norway, directly or indirectly. But even if such pressure might have averted an impending crisis, I do not think it could have produced an understanding of the scope and completeness actually existing. Now just as the wonderful common sense of those two peoples—based, I think, on an unusually developed power of imagination—had asserted itself in 1905, so it reasserted itself in this case; and by their action I believe that all possible German hopes of bringing Sweden into the fray on its own side were effectively disposed of.

But this understanding, so helpful by ridding Sweden and Norway of all mutual fear, might under certain circumstances involve both of them instead of only one. And this is the possibility which, in spite of all reassurances, keeps the Norwegians from feeling wholly secure. There are two quarters from which the danger might appear. The Russians might invade Sweden, or at least seize a naval base on the island of Gothland. The alleged designs of Russia on the northernmost part of the Scandinavian peninsula are well known to everybody who gives the least attention to international politics. I shall return to them later when discussing the position of Sweden. For the present I can dismiss them as buried under an avalanche of new events and opportunities too exciting to permit Russian attention to dwell on the distant north. I think this has been realized by the Norwegians, and that in so far as Russia still figures in their apprehensions it is rather as a temptation to Swedish aggressiveness than as a direct aggressor. And the Swedish attitude toward Russia since the beginning of the war has gone far toward dispelling the last vestige of this particular fear. It is the hold of Germany on Sweden—based on circumstances to be