in which these questions are framed, to a pragmatic approach that emphasizes the number and dimensions of the means available for involvement and expects social change to result from the application of those means, and especially to a belief in gradual progress that lays the emphasis on small-scale achievements. If such an approach is adopted, all comprehensive solutions and programs of national importance are rejected and activities are limited to a specific area of the country concerned and to the establishment of so-called functional mechanisms.

Action taken within the framework of what is "possible" is an attempt to create a certain number of "powers" at the grassroots level. It would entail not only developing the latent potential of farmers to the point where they became autonomous but also enabling them to acquire the capacity to become involved at a higher level. They would move up from one level to another, and each successful completion of a task would be the starting-point for the pursuit of a new objective. The attainment of an objective would indicate that a new "power" had been acquired and that their capacity to become involved had been increased.

This view of development has the advantage of, on the one hand, removing a dimension of false humanism and providing a political dimension, inasmuch as it is designed to create powers, and, on the other hand, of forcing the debate to concentrate on the internal problems of potentially recipient countries. This view should be considered further in order to determine whether the power structures developed as a result of the situation created by involvement could counterbalance the power structures generated by social structures.

It would be particularly useful to ftee how such objectives might be atta the prerequisite of social upheaval to a change in internal power relation not met.

Even a rapid breakdown of the of development shows that such I re structures have not yet been de of mainly because any action that By challenge the power of the ruling clorise not accepted. An experiment is to gues as long as it does not become a vels. Th social change but, once the new ther becomes a threat to the established Chi the latter reacts and smashes its po Mo challenger. It should be rememberhe te social change is conflict, which no fe shifted or controlled but not avoidely su

## Conclusion

The dilemma of co-operation boils disay a few simple questions: who does weader whom, with whom, on whose behalf Wh asks for what to be done? And who reg to do what?

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These questions in their ver plicity cast doubts on misleading ances and on many presuppositions lead back to a fundamental consideration of the conditions that should be for technical involvement to be and effective. In other words, the threshold below which any action the system is bound to fail. Once upon the system has made it possibadia the energies of the majority to be r and channelled towards social chargecen support of all men of good will and p who wish to become involved in a chi, k development project will be acThe partly as reparation and partly as a Japan of brotherhood. 456 p