

have expressed that recognition at the United Nations and elsewhere as recently as in the General Assembly before the recess and we have done all we could to translate that necessity into reality, but for one reason or another it has never been possible for the United Nations, except in the special and limited cases of Korea and the Middle East, to have armed forces at its disposal; the reason for that I will not go into at this time.

**Mr. Fulton:** Is it the view of the Canadian Government that the United Nations Emergency Force should be assigned a stabilizing role in connection with the Suez Canal?

**Mr. Pearson,** Well, Mr. Speaker, there are possibilities for that if such a role is needed, but if there is agreement between the users of the Canal and the Government of Egypt which would in its turn provide for a satisfactory means of resolving the dispute over the use of the Canal it might not be necessary, for any outside United Nations force to be present on the Canal while that agreement is in effect. I think the best thing to do is to wait and see how these discussions work out.

This present Emergency Force in the Middle East is a unique experiment in the use of an international police agency to secure and supervise the cease-fire which has been called for by the General Assembly. Why should we not, therefore, on the basis of this experience—the experience we have gained by the operation and establishment and organization of this force—consider how a more permanent United Nations machinery of this kind might be created for use in similar situations as required?

What the United Nations now would seem to need for these limited and essentially police functions is perhaps not so much a force in being as an assurance that members would be prepared to contribute contingents when asked to do so, to have them ready and organized for that purpose; with some appropriate central United Nations machinery along the lines of that which has already been established for this present Emergency Force.

The kind of force we have in mind would be designed to meet situations calling for action, intermediate if you like, between the passing of resolutions and the fighting of a war, and which might incidentally have the effect of reducing the risks of the latter. It would not, however, as I see it, be expected to operate in an area where fighting was actually in progress; it would be preventive and restoratory rather than punitive or belligerent.

It is not possible to determine in advance what would be required in any emergency, but surely members through the proper legislative processes could take in advance the necessary decisions in principle so that should the occasion arise the executive power could quickly meet United Nations requests for assistance which had been approved by it. In doing so we would be making at least some progress in putting international action behind international words.

## NATO

The third factor that has a bearing on our independence in foreign policy is NATO, our membership in which gives us, not only the assurance of a strong and collective defence if we are attacked but, even more important, is our strongest deterrent against attack. Since I last had occasion to speak on foreign affairs in the house a NATO Council meeting of very considerable importance has taken place in Paris.

The meeting took place in Paris from December 11 to December 15. Ministers from each of the NATO countries met in Paris. My colleague the Minister of National Defence (Mr. Campney) and I represented the Canadian Government at this meeting. In addition to the annual stocktaking of NATO's defence plan and the approval of a directive for future military planning, secret of course, which took into account both economic and atomic capabilities, we had what we considered to be useful discussions of the general international situation, particularly on the impact on the alliance of developments in the Middle East and Eastern Europe.

In these discussions we devoted more time than usual to political developments outside of what is described as the NATO treaty area. That merely reflected the increasing awareness of the NATO governments that the security, stability and well-being of an area like the Middle East, to quote one example, is essential to the maintenance of world peace, which in turn is the matter of primary concern to the NATO members.

A significant aspect of this recent meeting was the evident desire on the part of all members to strengthen the non-military side of NATO; as we increasingly realized that relations between the Western alliance and the Soviet have become a contest in terms of political judgment and action; of economic and industrial power, and not merely a contest in military strength. Having said that, it would be unwise not to add that it was recognized at our Council meeting that events in Hungary and the use of naked military force there by the Soviet Union—which use might have had far-reaching effects—these events have underlined the absolute necessity of maintaining also our military defensive strength as we become more and more preoccupied with the political and economic aspects of the struggle. As has been said by so many people so many times, we have to continue to do both.

It was to these problems of non-military co-operation confronting the alliance that the Committee of Three Report addressed itself. That report, which has been made public, was submitted to the Council and its recommendations were accepted by the Council members. Apart from maintaining defensive military strength the most important need of the NATO alliance in the present circumstances is for the development of common policies, as essential to that unity, which is important, as strength itself. The Committee