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of the arguments which I intended to offer in its support. I suppose, Sir, that this proposition will not be disputed in this House; namely, that laws which regulate, not the intercourse between the government and its subjects, but, merely, transactions between the different members of the community, or the conveyance or transmission of private property from one man to another, should be such as the people desire, unless they are incompatible with the safety of the government, or are unjust in their principle. I do not believe any one will deny this proposition, and, therefore, I will not stop to prove its truth. If it be granted, I think an irresistible conclusion may be drawn from it, in favour of this measure. On the other hand I will admit that a law ought not to be passed, however wise and just it may be, unless there is some considerable practical evil which it will remove, or some practicable good which it will produce. In other words, it is not a sufficient reason for an enactment that it is the theoretically excellent, unless it is practically needed. For instance, however just the principle of this bill may be, and however beneficial its operation might be still, if our present law produces no serious evils, if its injustice is obviated by the practice of making will, I would not urge its alteration. I feel it to be necessary, therefore, to shew you that there are and necessarily must be great evils under our present law, notwithstanding the right which is generally possessed of making a will. I maintain that the necessity for an alteration of the present law, which arises from its unjust operation, is not obviated by this right of disposing of the property by devise. For, in the first place, although this right is generally enjoyed, yet it is not universally possessed, and is exercised only in a few cases. Married women and minors cannot dispose of their real estates by will, and instances have been related to me of the unjust operation of our present law, which affected me not a little. In one case the father devised his property equally among his children.