

ultimate applications to the legal code, perhaps some discussions, which appear to be divergencies, might yet become elementary cognitions of our science, and perhaps there would be less disaccord. There are various moral disorders, and different degrees of these; not only are there different degrees, but the very same individual may have them in one single direction, and we may find one individual who is habitually, and very readily, inclined to some delinquency or fault, whether such as to bring him before the courts, or not. A person with such a disorder of his moral conceptions, when placed in a different position, may really appear to be a man of pure moral sense; in one field a hero, but in another a wretch for the gallows, or certainly a man deserving of reproach in the forum of moral conscience; and why? Because we easily construct lumping groups of the so-called mental faculties, when each of such groups has only to be split up into so many several parts, which when closely regarded, impress each individual with a special importance.

I therefore here repeat, begging pardon for so curious a phrase in this (!) hall, "before the judgment seat of God who will be justified?" I once heard this phrase, and it impressed me deeply, for many are the sins of moral sentiment which only the pure conscience can value justly; outside the conscience of one who feels these sins, or of one who may fall into any transgression whatever, every thing in these moments appears limpid and clear, very different from what transpires in the unfortunate one, who by the law of mental disturbance, commits an act which brings him to the scaffold. Moral insanity therefore, in general, in our scientific studies, not in those of legal appliance, is a disorder in the moral sentiments; and if, in these, disorders may arise, the passage therefrom to disorders of action is possible, and they are to be valued and judged of in relation to the degree of moral sense.

Let us first ask: is it inevitable that a disordered