

External Affairs

as to when it can and will be done? And so we are left with the essential problem on which I maintain we are entitled to be informed by the government: What does this government intend to do to assure that there will be brought into existence, if it does not exist now, adequate machinery so that there will be prior consultation, and that there will be agreed courses of action before those courses of action have to be implemented, in other words before the event of any Russian attack. Because, as I see it, there is not anything now in existence to ensure that there will be always that prior consultation and those agreed courses of action which can be set in motion immediately.

It seems to me that no country, least of all the United States, can contemplate the sort of delay that working out an agreed course of action might entail, after an attack against the West had been commenced. Therefore in the absence of evidence that there exists that consultative machinery now, which will enable us to arrive at an agreed course of action before attack, I cannot see any reason for reassurance, or any reason why the minister should be more satisfied after he was in Washington than before he went to Washington.

I should like the minister to tell us what is the Canadian policy, because certainly no country has a greater stake in this matter than Canada. What is the Canadian policy? What courses are we going to urge upon our allies in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to make sure that that organization becomes and is used as a consultative machinery to enable us to work out those great courses of action in so far as that is humanly possible in advance of a Russian attack? I say, "in so far as that is humanly possible" because it seems to me that where it is not possible—and we cannot anticipate every potential attack that may be made and where it may be made and when it may be made by the Russians or by any other aggressor—there has to be good faith and not all this trouble and to some extent these unrealistic misgivings that our allies intend almost to react or to act without consulting with us. But in those acts which cannot be foreseen and where even general principles cannot be worked out in advance, then we do have to rely upon good sense and mutual understanding.

I should like to return to another aspect of this whole matter of consulting which seems to have worried the minister so much, but on which he has also left us, or in certain very important aspects of which he has left this house, this parliament, in the dark. I refer there again to the matter of consultation or

information, if you like, between the Canadian government and the Canadian parliament. That it seems to me has become a very immediate problem in the light of the developments which have taken place in our foreign policy, and particularly in the light of the fact that Canada has now undertaken commitments under a treaty of alliance, which is a relatively new departure in this country. It is interesting to note that the minister made an implied condemnation of Mr. Dulles for what he said by almost a suggestion—that is, before it was satisfactorily explained—of a return to a continental security complex. Here I read what the minister said at page 3329 of *Hansard* of his statement on Thursday. After analysing what Mr. Dulles might have meant in his January 12 speech, he said:

And yet, if we relied too much on that and depreciated the importance of local defence, that would be interpreted in many countries as meaning that some countries were expendable. And I doubt if we could maintain a coalition, even NATO, very long, on that basis. Inevitably there would be a retreat to isolation.

Therefore, Mr. Speaker, this was by inference, as I read it at any rate, suggested by the minister as being a possible interpretation of Mr. Dulles' speech. The minister went on:

There would be a move towards what sometimes is called continental security, both in North America and—and this is sometimes forgotten—in Europe itself.

But security of this variety, continental security, is a delusion, because, and I think the house will agree with me, there can be no continental security without collective security. And there can be no collective security without collective arrangements for collective action.

Well, as I say, it is interesting to trace developments in this country, and it is interesting to contrast that with what was Canada's policy just four short years ago when, in the clearest possible language, the Prime Minister himself outlined the policy of continental security, that particular policy which the minister has said it would be so wrong for the United States or anyone else to put forward today. I am reading now from page 680 of *Hansard* for the second session of 1950. You will recall, Mr. Speaker, that this session was called not very long after the outbreak of war in Korea, and the Prime Minister was discussing Canada's position with respect to sending forces to Europe under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He said that what we were going to do was to make \$300 million available. We were not going to make any commitments to send troops to Europe under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization because he said:

I say that because it seems perfectly obvious to me that if we are to get the greatest possible effective strength in Europe for the money and resources we devote to national and international security, \$300 million spent on the equipping and