

3] The responsibility of the presidency for the implementation of common policies and for their representation in international fora will not change. However, a number of suggestions are on the table for strengthening the capacity of the presidency to undertake these tasks.

4] As part of the effort to make the formulation of common foreign and security policies more timely and appropriate to changing circumstances, it is likely that a policy planning and early warning capability will be established. The composition of this organization is likely to include personnel seconded from member states, the Council Secretariat, the Commission, and, in the Irish draft, from the WEU as well.

5] Provision for the appointment of one or more special representatives having responsibility for various aspects of the CFSP also have been suggested. These suggestions may be grouped with the proposal that a CFSP "High Authority" be appointed. If this route is taken, then the day-to-day responsibilities of the presidency will be affected.

6] The general obligation to support common positions "in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity" is likely to be reinforced by a more general commitment to do so with respect to all aspects of the Union's presence in international affairs. This, in turn, reflects a strategy designed to integrate the CFSP into a more fully integrated treaty structure for the Union.

7] Attempts are being made to reinforce the majority voting procedures with respect to joint actions. This will meet the strong resistance of the U.K. among others, but the salient point is that these suggestions are part of a wider attempt to diminish the power of the veto and enable a majority wishing to act to do so. This is linked to the wider and contentious issue of "flexibility".

8] The Irish draft reflects the efforts of those seeking to strengthen the security mandate of the CFSP and makes reference to the "progressive" rather than the "eventual" framing of a common defence policy. This, in turn, is linked to attempts to strengthen the functional and political links between the WEU and the E.U. In other words, the attempt is being made to give substance to a European Security and Defence Identity within the Union.

9] One suggestion that has been made with the hope of strengthening the Union's presence as an actor in world affairs is to endow the Union with legal personality in a fashion comparable to that of the Community with respect to its common external policies. There is considerable resistance to this on both technical and political grounds. Among the concerns expressed is the problem of defining what in fact the Union (as distinct from the EC), would be signing on to. The fifteen partners could still interpret their obligations under the Treaty differently, and this in turn could lead to difficulties with third parties who believed that agreement had been reached with the Union only to find that individual Union members interpreted the agreement differently, and thus involving a further set of bilateral negotiations. It is frustrating enough for third parties in dealing with the Union as it is, endowing the Union with legal personality with respect to the CFSP would, in effect, simply add another negotiating hurdle for