

China's NACD policies have been guided by a number of principles persistently stipulated over the years.<sup>41</sup> First and foremost is the argument that since the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia possess the largest nuclear and conventional arsenals in the world, they bear a primary and unshirkable responsibility in disarmament. Second, all NACD measures are but steps toward the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of all nuclear weapons. In other words, nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear test bans, fissile material production cut-offs, etc., are not the goals themselves, but are specific measures and steps toward the ultimate objective of eliminating all nuclear weapons. In addition, China insists that NACD will not succeed unless the root causes of global/regional conflicts are addressed. This involves economic, political, as well as military and NACD measures. Third, as the danger of nuclear war threatens the entire human race, every country has the equal right to participate in the discussion and settlement of the question of nuclear disarmament.<sup>42</sup>

While the Chinese have persistently enunciated their principles over the years, in handling specific NACD negotiations and dealing with particular issues, they have managed to present policy positions in ways that both preserve (if not advance) core national security interests and appear in conformity with declared principled stance.

**Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).** China acceded to the NPT in 1992 and has supported the three major objectives of the treaty--the promotion of nuclear disarmament, the prevention of nuclear proliferation and the enhancement of international cooperation for peaceful uses of nuclear energy.<sup>43</sup> At the same time, it also demonstrates its shared concerns with NAM regarding a number of defects in the NPT, especially on Articles IV and VI. However, while appearing sympathetic with the positions of non-nuclear weapons states, and proposing specific measures to address their concerns, China's positions during the NPT extension conference seemed ambivalent except for a repetition of its well-known principles.<sup>44</sup> Its nuclear testing two days after the indefinite extension of the treaty highlights the conflict between principles and actual behaviour, however the latter has

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<sup>41</sup> Jing-dong Yuan, "Arms Control and Non-Proliferation: Chinese Perspectives and Policies," in Andrew Latham, ed., *Non-Proliferation Agreements, Arrangements and Responses: Proceedings of the 1996 Canadian Non-Proliferation Workshop* (Toronto: Centre for International and Security Studies, 1997), pp.87-104.

<sup>42</sup> Statement of Chinese Foreign Minister Wu Xueqian at the Conference on Disarmament, CD/PV.400, pp.2-7. See also, 'Basic Positions of the Chinese Delegation on the Prevention of Nuclear War', Working Paper submitted to CD, CD/691; 'Working Paper on Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and Realization of Nuclear Disarmament', CD/767; Chinese Ambassador Qian Jiadong at CD, CD/PV 330, pp.31-34; Chinese Ambassador Li Luye at CD, CD/PV 215.

<sup>43</sup> 'China Supports Extension', *FBIS-CHI*, 19 April 1995, p.1.

<sup>44</sup> Du Gengqi, 'NPT Treaty at Crossroads', *BR*, 24-30 April 1995, p.19; Fan Guoxiang, 'INF Negotiations and Nuclear Disarmament', *Disarmament*, Vol.11, No.1 (Winter 1987/1988), p.23. See also, 'Heated Exchanges on NPT Extension', *RMRB*, 27 April 1995, p.6; Huang Qing, 'A Step of Great Significance', *RMRB*, 18 May 1995, p.6.