

Register did not diminish for 1993 (i.e. importer and exporter reports did not match). Three reasons for this problem are offered: first, differing definitions of an arms transfer; second, different interpretations of the weapons categories; and, finally, errors in accounting.

Problems continue to plague the "background information" section of the Register as well. In this section, states are invited to provide information on military holdings and procurement through national production. However, no standard reporting format exists. Despite an increase in the number of submissions (from 25 in 1992 to 30 in 1993), there remains a wide diversity in the quality of reports. As a result, meaningful comparisons of military capabilities are impossible.

Chalmers and Greene also assess the Register's performance in the Asia-Pacific region. They argue that much of the information made public by the Register on the area is not available elsewhere (e.g. the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI)); as a result, the Register has made a substantial contribution to transparency. However, since military holdings and procurement through national production are not included in the Register, useful comparisons of troop strengths remain problematic. Nevertheless, the Register could serve as a basis for bilateral or regional discussions (e.g. to clarify motivations for arms acquisitions). If the Register hopes to build on its success in the region, the immediate priority should be promoting wider participation.

504. Donowaki, Mitsuro. "Conventional Weapons: Code of Conduct for International Transfer and Indigenous Production." A Paper Presented at the United Nations Conference on Disarmament Issues. Nagasaki, Japan: June 12-16, 1995.

Donowaki examines the UN Register of Conventional Arms in conjunction with other arms control measures. He describes four attempts at restraining the proliferation of arms: first, promote transparency in the transfer, production and stockpiling of conventional weapons (e.g. the UN Register); second, introduce some restraint in the conduct of arms transfers (e.g. Permanent Five Talks); third, control the transfer of dual-use technology; and, finally, curb the sale of small arms.

Created in the wake of the Gulf War, the UN Register, argues Donowaki, has three goals. First, it is a confidence-building mechanism, not an arms control measure. In this respect, a high participation level is important. Second, it is designed to achieve greater transparency in the field of arms transfers. In contrast to its confidence-building role, accuracy in reporting is more important than widespread participation. Donowaki maintains that there is still room for improvement in this area (e.g. clarify the contentious missiles and missile launchers category). Finally, it is to contribute to restraint in military production and the transfer of arms. It is argued that, to date, the Register has failed to meet this last objective. A consultative mechanism should be created to improve the Register's credibility in this role.

In order for the Register concept to be successful, it must lay the groundwork for a new code of conduct in the arms trade. Once transparency has been established, the next step is to promote the creation of national controls on arms exports. A further