

22. The Group of 21 stated that the international community has recognised that the question relating to verification and compliance can only be considered in tandem with other aspects of a treaty and referred to paragraph 31 of the Final Document of SSOD I which states that the form and modalities of the verification to be provided in any agreement depends upon and should be determined by the purpose, scope and nature of the agreement. In their view, the treaty on a nuclear test ban should be equitable and non-discriminatory so as to attract universal adherence and should include a verification system that is universal in its application, non-discriminatory in character and guarantees equal access to all States. Many delegations reiterated that the question of verification of a nuclear test ban was political not technical in nature and that appropriate verification methods were at hand. The view was expressed that national technical means of verification coupled with the proposed international exchange of seismic data would be adequate for monitoring a future treaty. It was pointed out that the trilateral negotiators' joint report to the Committee on Disarmament in 1980 had made it clear that definite progress has been made on the question of verification and compliance of a treaty in that all the three parties had agreed to use national technical means for verification and there was an agreement on on-site inspections on a voluntary basis.

23. A Group of Western States stressed that current seismic monitoring techniques cannot detect a range of military significant testing at the low end of the spectrum, and pointed out the need for further development of nuclear test ban monitoring systems and their capability and reliability. It was also pointed out that consideration should be given to the development and implementation of new monitoring technologies. One delegation within this group recalled its proposal for the establishment, testing and further development of a global seismic network as an important means of verifying compliance with a comprehensive test ban treaty.

24. Some delegations stressed again the need for a step-by-step approach that would allow a gradual refinement of a multilateral system in accordance with the experience gained during the establishment and adoption of parts of the system because of pertinent developments in science and technology.

25. Several delegations called for greater transparency by those States conducting nuclear tests in the provision of information and data on their nuclear testing.

26. Delegations shared the view that one of the basic elements of an effective multilateral verification system was seismic monitoring. In that regard, much support was expressed for the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. Some delegations suggested that the Ad Hoc Committee could consider ways to give guidance to the work of the Ad Hoc Group. One delegation reiterated its proposal to expand the mandate of that Group to include other means of verification besides seismic monitoring.

27. Upon invitation by the Committee, the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events, its Scientific Secretary and the Coordinator of the Group's Second Technical Test (GSETT-2) reported to the Ad Hoc Committee at its third meeting on 6 August 1990, on the status of the Group's