

the characteristics of space vehicles, invitations to inspect space vehicles and ground control installations and attend launchings, and explanation of the behaviour of satellites whose activities raised concerns regarding their mission.

Thirty-seven states have joined in a registration convention initiated in 1975, according to which they are to report to the United Nations certain details of vehicles that they launch into space. In a study of the applications of confidence-building measures in outer space,⁹ the United Nations noted suggestions that had been proposed by member countries for the creation of bodies to carry out functions likely to reduce the probability of having an arms race in space. These included an International Satellite Monitoring Agency and an International Space Monitoring Agency (both oriented toward verification and crisis monitoring as well as confidence-building); an International Trajectory Centre; a Satellite Image Processing Agency (for confidence-building rather than verification); and a World Space Organization (for the development of communications, navigation, rescue, remote sensing and weather forecasting). There was also a proposal for the building of a satellite (PAXSAT-A) designed to examine other satellites for evidence of the presence of weapons. And there was a proposal to establish an international code of conduct "to guarantee the security of space activities while preventing the use of space for aggressive purposes." Among other measures this could arrange procedures to prevent collisions between space vehicles.

In general, it is to be expected that if a country has no aggressive intentions toward a neighbouring state, and feels increasing confidence in the benign intentions of the neighbour toward itself, there will be motivation to demonstrate to the neighbour that it is facing no threat from that quarter, and little concern over exposure of military capabilities.

A very important action, which spans both arms control and confidence-building measures, is an un-negotiated unilateral declaration of the intention to eliminate certain armaments. As has been demonstrated in bilateral reductions between the United States and the Soviet Union, such a measure can generate a reciprocal act. There may be no verification of such reductions, but more likely the parties will take steps to demonstrate that they are in fact carrying out the reductions that they have announced. Such actions are excellent examples of confidence-building.

Confidence-building measures must be tailored to the circumstances of the relevant region and the security concerns of the parties involved. As confidence builds, the measures are likely to evolve, and may at some stage be converted into more formal undertakings.¹⁰

⁹ *Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer Space. Study of the application of confidence-building measures in outer space, Report by the Secretary-General (New York: UN General Assembly, document no. A/48/305, October 15, 1993).*

¹⁰ One likely example of this evolution is with the confidence-building provisions of the BTWC being converted into verification of a modified treaty. Another is the use of Open Skies for verification of the CFE Treaty.

