

Mr. IMAI (Japan): Mr. President, I have asked for the floor today in order to introduce Working Paper CD/619 on chemical weapons verification. Before doing so, however, since this is the first time I speak before the Conference on Disarmament in the summer part of its session, let me begin by first congratulating you, Ambassador Ould-Rouis, on your assumption of the important office of President for the month of July. I would like to express the sincere appreciation of my delegation for the skilful manner in which you have guided the Conference. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank the delegation of Zaire which had taken the Presidency for the month of June. I would also like to extend a welcome to the Ambassador of Argentina upon his attendance in the Conference on Disarmament. May I also be permitted to express the sincere welcome of my delegation to Ambassador Jessel of France, and at the same time to say how sorry we are to see the departure of Ambassador Carasales of Argentina from our forum.

It has been one of the constant themes of the Japanese delegation in the discussion of disarmament measures that effective, acceptable and appropriate multilateral verification is one of the most central, although complicated and thus challenging, tasks. The difficulties stem not only from political considerations of disarmament but from technical details, and very much more and very often from the fact that one is dealing with the complicated and sophisticated structure of modern industries. To find an adequate system to suit the purpose is not easy. At the same time, we consider it fortunate that the international community has a wealth of experience at least in one form of such multilateral verification measures. I refer here to the experience of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the implementation of safeguards against diversion of nuclear material from peaceful uses to possible military

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