

such zones might be useful means to separate actual or potential combattant forces and to act as a wider-ranging CBM. In establishing such zones, however, a significant personnel deployment will likely be necessary and this level of involvement might have to be sustained for some time, especially if uncertainties persist on one or more sides about the use of the zone.

The second stage might require simply an observer mission as the parties to the accord became accustomed to the idea of a de-militarized zone. However, even here the likely size of some such zones could require significant personnel levels to maintain the certainty of their de-militarized status.

Insurgent collection zones have attracted considerable attention since the Sapoá agreement of March 1988. This accord called for several collection zones into which the insurgents would move and eventually disarm, and from which they would finally disperse in order to resume their part in the national economic and political scene. It is difficult to imagine a more potentially thorny peacekeeping responsibility than that of overseeing this sort of provision.

At no stage of the implementation of an accord's provisions would there be so much room for disaster through distrust, fear, excessive zeal or mere sloppiness. Government forces generally despise the insurgents in El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua. Indeed, as is well known, significant elements of the armed forces, particularly in the officer corps of both El Salvador and Guatemala, see peace in any form other than victory as a disaster for their country and for the particular interests to which they are most closely tied. These persons could easily be persuaded that molesting the establishment of insurgent collection zones would easily and effectively sabotage the peace accord as a whole. Even in Nicaragua, hatred for the contras is such that sabotage might be contemplated by some. Nor should one discount the possibility of false allegations on the part of the insurgents.

Even without such determined opposition, however, the task of establishing and maintaining such zones could be a great one and the failure to do so could indeed end the whole accord experiment. Insurgents would have to move, often through government-held territory patrolled by their very recent (at best) enemies, to the zones in question. The temptation for the armed forces "to settle accounts" at this stage could be almost irresistible, even with the cease-fire, especially when the military are provided with pin-pointed insurgent movements. Frayed nerves and loose discipline among troops and local commanders might do the work organized military operations no longer could undertake. Verifying activities in such zones would tie in closely with the verification of a cease-fire in general. Insurgents would be required to move in groups, accompanied by observers. Also needed would be the withdrawal of government forces from these zones. It must be understood, however, that verifying insurgent collection zones may well be the most difficult part of implementing a cease-fire.