

News of the arts

Prime Minister urges NATO arms control in the search for security

"The search for security can too easily be conducted only through armaments improvement. It must also be sought through effective arms control and disarmament." Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau was addressing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization Summit meeting in Washington on May 30. Passages from his speech follow:

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...The Alliance study of long-term trends in East-West relations holds out little prospect of significant change in the Soviet Union. That is perhaps too conservative a conclusion. But we must probably accept that what change may come about will not be such as radically to alter the calculations about Western security that we have had to make over the past generation.

The Soviet Union will continue to regard the U.S.A. as the only power capable of fundamentally challenging Soviet security, which means that it will continue to attempt to match the U.S.A. as a global power with power globally deployable. It will also, presumably, continue to assess the other combined threats to Soviet security, including the desire to preserve its paramouncy in Eastern Europe, as requiring a military posture that we in the West regard as being excessive on any reasonable assumptions. As has been said by a seasoned observer of the Soviet scene, the Soviet Union is unlikely ever to feel secure except in circumstances where everyone else feels insecure.

Pursue all avenues

We have received repeated assurances from Soviet leaders that their massive military capacity neither threatens nor is intended to threaten our security. We should note these assurances and weigh them carefully. They are not without importance or value. But it would be imprudent if we were to base our policies on assurances rather than actions — on declared or assumed intentions rather than on manifest capabilities. We cannot wait for the Soviet Union to develop such a preponderance of military capability that the balance will swing strongly in its favour enabling it to achieve security on its own terms. The Soviets' assurance of complete security cannot be bought at the cost of our incapacity to protect ourselves. That would be no basis either for security or for *détente*. In seeking to improve the reality of our security we must maintain the balance of deterrent strength.

But our security problem will not be solved simply by the reactive policy of trying to match the military capacity of the potential adversary. We must also pursue with vigour, at every opportunity and along every avenue open to us, the goals of a meaningful policy of *détente* and of a genuine reduction in our mutual capacity to wage war.

In the long run, there is no real alternative to pursuing *détente* with the Soviet Union — a process which we must continue to promote. But for *détente* to be pursued and made a permanent feature of the East-West relationship, confidence must exist not only between governments. It must exist also between and among our citizens for, in the West, it is our publics that determine how fast and in what direction we can proceed. This public confidence can only be maintained if the human dimension of *détente*, as embodied in the Helsinki Final Act, is respected and the individual is allowed his rightful place in society and in contacts across frontiers. If *détente* is seen to be applied selectively support for it is likely to erode. This prospect cannot be treated lightly by any government.

Search for security

I attended the Special Session on Disarmament of the United Nations only a few days ago. While arms control and disarmament are sometimes obscured by controversy and diverted by rhetoric, I believe there is today a real and widespread yearning for a turning of the corner — for a reversal of the arms race and a real concern about where present trends will lead us. This presents NATO with both an opportunity and a challenge to find ways in which security can be achieved at lower levels of armament. The search for security can too easily be conducted only through armaments improvement. It must also be sought through effective arms control and disarmament. The members of the Alliance should undertake a major effort to develop further positive and constructive proposals in this domain.

My Government has followed closely and has appreciated the detailed consulta-

tion within the Alliance undertaken by the Government of the U.S.A. in the course of its strategic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union. We recognize the complexity of the issues and understand the difficulties involved. We retain the hope, however, that the process of which these negotiations form a part will continue and that over time it will be possible to take significant steps towards the reduction of strategic nuclear armament.

We should redouble our efforts to impart some political resolve for forward movement at Vienna, where, for five frustrating years, our representatives have been labouring hard to reduce the level of conventional forces confronting one another in Europe. Neither the process of *détente* nor the agreements reached on security and co-operation in Europe are likely to go very far unless we can make some headway in these negotiations. Despite repeated Western initiatives, the talks remain bogged down. The time has surely come to give these talks some fresh impetus and to test what willingness there is on the other side to achieve agreement.

Support for defence plan

Still, even as we consider the possibility of reduction in the level of forces in Central Europe, we cannot wish away the reality of the massive military capability which faces us and which is growing. The long-term defence program is designed to ensure that collectively we make the best possible use of our resources to maintain an adequate deterrent and defence posture. I support the concept and the objectives of the program. It is an important element of the framework within which Canada, in common with its allies, can pursue the programs necessary to adjust the collective deterrent strength of NATO to the needs of the next decade, and to ensure that Canada's military contribution is compatible with those needs.

I also fully support the objectives of closer co-operation in the industrial activity associated with the maintenance of our defence. It makes no sense that we should each go our own way in equipping our armed forces. The inevitable consequences of a lack of reasonable standardization of our defence equipment and of our operational doctrines are an uneconomic use of resources and a serious loss of effectiveness....

The more efficient use of our resources is a step forward. But in the final analysis we will not be militarily strong