

4. At the time of the confiscation General Middleton directed Mr. Reed to send an order in writing to the Police officer in Battleford who had charge of the furs. The exact wording of this order cannot be clearly established as it was destroyed a few days after it was written. But it is proved to have been of the following tenor:

That General Middleton had confiscated the furs, and had ordered that two packages of them should be put up for himself, one for Mr. Hayter Reed, one for Mr. Bedson, and one for another member of his staff, selecting the best; and that receipts should be taken for, or a memorandum made of the furs thus distributed.

5. Packages were put up in conformity with this order—two for General Middleton, one for Mr. Hayter Reed and one for Mr. Bedson—the furs put up were in quantity about one-eighth of the whole, but of much larger proportionate value.

6. It has been proved before your committee that the furs put up for General Middleton and Mr. Bedson were placed on board the steamer which conveyed General Middleton and Mr. Bedson, from Battleford to Winnipeg. But it would appear that Mr. Bedson, who had promised to give a receipt for the furs, refused to do so, alleging that they had not reached Winnipeg; and the committee find that the packages of furs so shipped to General Middleton were not received by him.

7. The furs put up for Mr. Hayter Reed were forwarded to Regina and received by him there. He subsequently returned the package unopened to the Police authorities at Battleford, alleging as his reason for so doing that the propriety of the confiscation was questioned.

8. The committee consider the confiscation of the furs unwarrantable and illegal; and in his evidence General Middleton admits that he has recently become satisfied it was not legally justifiable. The committee are further of the opinion that, if the confiscation had been legal, the confiscated property rested in the Crown; and while the committee believe General Middleton acted under an unfortunate misconception as to his powers, they are of the opinion that the appropriation of any portion of the property under such circumstances by General Middleton to his own use and to that of the members of his staff was highly improper.

9. On behalf of Bremner it was stated to the committee that he is willing to accept \$4,500 inclusive of interest in compensation for his loss, and this the committee consider a fair compensation.

10. For the information of the House the committee submit herewith the minutes of the evidence taken by them in this enquiry, also the minutes of the proceedings of the committee, which, with this report, they recommend to be printed.

Infantry Training.

(United Service Gazette.)

The Adjutant-General presided at the meeting recently of the Royal United Service Institution, when an interesting paper on this subject was read by Colonel the Right Hon. J. H. A. Macdonald, C. B., commanding the Fourth Volunteer Brigade. After pointing out the completely changed conditions of modern warfare, Colonel Macdonald specified the characteristics of the modern infantry combat which call for modification of military training.

1. The change in the range and efficiency of modern fire-arms, both great and small, has added to the physical strain and fatigue of the fight.

2. The moral strain is much greater than it was formerly. It may be true that the proportion of losses in the modern fight is not so different from those of former days as might have been expected. But they are more concentrated in time, and must be suffered in many cases when there is not the possibility of that retaliation which is seen and felt to be effective, and thus stimulates the survivors.

3. There is no possibility of an advance in solid form at shoulder to shoulder. The moral effect of that time-honoured formation is completely lost, as no troops could live in it up to the point when it could be so seen as to produce a moral effect, and even if they could, no well-disciplined army, with modern arms, would be alarmed by it.

4. The long and rapid advance over the field is against the troops being in physical condition for effective fire, and makes difficult the maintenance of sufficient staying power for the final assault.

5. The tremendous rapidity and roar of modern fire renders the direct control by set words of command by the colonels of battalions—and in degree even by the captains of companies—a thing unattainable.

6. Fire discipline, that fire may be well directed, and fire control, that it may be delivered so as to speak the language of well-regulated determination, are rendered difficult from the causes already enumerated.

7. The power of rapidly rallying into order, out of the necessary or accidental confusion caused by the combat, is much more essential than formerly, as, from the very necessity of the case, the counter attack as a

power of defence must be not merely an occasional expedient, but a practical part of every well-thought-out defence disposition.

Lastly, when to all those things there is added the undoubted fact that the time available for the training of infantry is very much less than it was in old days, when the soldier enlisted for all the best years of his manhood, and when musketry was an insignificant part of his work, it is obvious that no system which availed us formerly can avail us now without great modification. Modern conditions require the highest discipline. Nothing short of it will suffice, and the highest discipline cannot be that of the obedient but unthinking mass, moving by habit only; it must be that of intelligent self-reliance of the man acting in obedient subordination to leadership.

Colonel Macdonald then touched on four of the more salient points—the command, the control of sub-units, the principle of formation, and the management of fire.

The character of the command of infantry calls for very serious consideration. The characteristic of the old system of command was that nothing should be taken out of the hand of the higher commander which it was possible for him to retain. The direct command must be as much as possible brought down to the company commander. He must in turn rely for direct leading of its fractions upon those below him, much more than has been the case in times past.

One marked defect in our present Infantry training is the absence of any group system. The only group hinted at in our Infantry Drill Book is the section of four. This is undoubtedly too small, but it is probable that as fours is the formation upon which, as the Drill Book says, "nearly all movements depend," a group consisting of a multiple of fours will be found satisfactory. Having received official permission some years ago to practise a system of attack that was to be reported on, the lecturer adopted as an addition to it a group arrangement, which can be applied to any mode of attack or other manœuvre without in any way interfering with system. It consisted of two sections of fours. In proving, the word was given when in fours deep, "Groups Tell Off," which was done by the leading men of fours calling out "First—Second," "First—Second from right to left. The order was then given, "Groups Inwards Turn," and the eight men turned inwards and were taught to observe each other. The group leader—either a corporal or an experienced man selected—shouldered arms after turning inwards, so that the men might notice him. These eight men were always together, parading, drilling, marching, sleeping, messing, going on guard, picquet, camp-scavenging, and all other duties. The result of this arrangement was the wonder of all who saw it. After a day or two these eights held together in the most efficient manner. The power of rallying after attack (conducted without previous trial, through rough ground and a thick ravined wood) was such that although the attack was never stayed longer than was necessary to fire, and the charge was delivered from the edge of the wood, without any chance of rallying in the open before it, the most perfect order was at once restored, and in ten seconds the battalion marched off with every man in his place.

For many years some of those who are anxious to adapt drill to the requirements of the time have been urging that our military mode of standing in the ranks and of march should be altered. Regularity of position and movement has hitherto obtained by bodily feeling—the use of sight being forbidden. Judgment of interval by the eye is the normal condition of all modern infantry exercise, and therefore this condition should rule, and not that which is inapplicable to service. The Germans, whose example has been used as a final fortress against the assault of the wild revolutionist, have adopted drill with intervals as their normal mode, and this with universal satisfaction from the Emperor down to the youngest recruit. Touch is now forbidden. Every man has to march free from contact with another.

The last desideratum, and certainly not the least, is training in fire, which includes two very important points—first, fire discipline, that the soldier may be so routined in the use of his weapon that he shall never fail to use it for fire coolly, collectedly, intelligently, and in accordance with the rules which he has been taught for accurate practice; and, second, fire control, that the soldier may be so disciplined in the application of his shooting instruction that he shall not fire except when his immediate superior orders him to fire, shall fire at that which he is directed to fire at, shall use the mode of fire he is desired to use, and shall set the sights to the elevation which in the judgment of his superior should be used, and shall only fire independently when in doing so he is carrying out the spirit of the directions he has received.

Musketry teaches the steady man how to make effective use of his steadiness. Drill, if applied to firing, gives the steadiness which saves the skill from being dissipated and lost. Therefore, let it be the rule of the exercise ground that no body of men, small or great, shall on any occasion leave it without having acquired some additional fire discipline, by having the orders for fire rung out to them in clear tones by the commanders of the smaller units, and by their being made to go methodically