

The following is the scheme for mobilization of the military forces of Great Britain. Under present conditions it is without doubt the best and most comprehensive that could be devised—although to our minds it does look strange that militia regiments should be brought all the way from Ireland to defend London.

We also venture to assert that an invasion of Great Britain will be effected if ever through Ireland. Any attempt on the former would be false strategy if the latter could not be occupied at the same time.

"The next Army List will, we believe, show the addition in its pages of a complete scheme of mobilization corresponding to our actual means, and which, being based on carefully studied documents with which the War Office has been supplied by the Quartermaster General and his officers, is no mere paper work, but a thoughtful and compendious key to operations which could be practically carried out at 24 hours' notice.

"The Army Corps is adopted as the main unit of the Field Army when mobilized; and the headquarters of each corps being once fixed on, with proper relation to the two main requirements of ease in concentration and suitability to the possibilities of invasion, it would become a simple matter to assign to each its share of the Auxiliary Forces, since these are essentially local. The Regulars cannot be so simply dealt with, since their stations are constantly being changed; and in any scheme of concentration infinite confusion would be caused by the attempt to bring, say, the 96th Regiment to its present place in the 1st Brigade of the 1st Division of the 1st Corps at Colchester, from some quarters occupied by it next year in the North of England or West of Ireland. But this apparent difficulty is at once got rid of by considering the order now to be given to it in the barracks it occupies at Colchester as given, not to it numerically, but only so long as it occupies that particular barracks, and to be as of course transferred to the battalion succeeding it in the same quarters. This simple expedient is to be adopted with each unit of the regular army. So long as it is quartered in a particular set of buildings it is attached according to the mobilization scheme, to a particular part of the appropriate army corps. It is furnished accordingly with a copy, unsigned, of its marching orders, when it is required to move at the word to mobilize, showing clearly the exact route, whether by road or rail, and the time necessary for the operation; the commanding officer thus being enabled to prepare for his supposed duty, the possibility of which hangs over him so long as his station remains unchanged. When he passes to a new one he finds a new set of instructions equally applicable, while his successor comes into the position he occupied, in the instance supposed, at Colchester, and will be ready to move at the same word to fall into his proper place with his men.

"The system of route for the regular forces being provided for, the next point was hardly less important—their distribution. Omitting Volunteers for the present, our defence field army would be so largely made up of Militia—since without calling them into the field the numbers would be wholly insufficient—that it became necessary to study with peculiar care the question how best to bestow the regular infantry. It was decided, on grave consideration, that it is

futile to ignore in any complete scheme the possibility of having to act, though it were but temporarily, on the offensive, so far, at least, as to be ready to ship one or two corps abroad. But to do this evidently the Army Corps selected must be formed of regulars. On the other hand, if England were mobilizing her forces, it would be essential to have in each corps at least one body, not less strong than a brigade, as a nucleus and model for the rest. After providing for this latter contingent to each five strictly defensive entire corps, and keeping the Guards together in one division of a sixth, to be posted directly between London and the coast, it was found not practicable not to have quite two complete corps of regular troops. There are but five divisions (each of six battalions only) available, and three of them are required for a corps according to our present model, which, it may here be observed, varies from the continental standard, inasmuch as the divisions are more numerous, and less in size. It follows that the 1st Corps only can be purely of regulars. This is fixed for mobilization at Colchester, where there is the convenience of a camp, and a position suitable to the special defence of the Eastern Coast and the river approach to London. Its three divisions would have their headquarters severally at Colchester, Chelmsford, and Gravesend, where they would be in easy communication with one another in case absolute concentration of the whole was, unhappily, necessary. The 2nd Corps can have but two divisions of regulars and its headquarters and 1st Division fall naturally at Aldershot, the 2nd Division being at Guildford, and the 3rd wholly of Militia, at Dorking. Of the 3rd Corps, which will be mobilized to cover the south of London, a word has been already said. The 1st Division of this is constituted by the Foot Guards, with headquarters at Croydon; and the 2nd and 3rd Division, each of Militia, would be collected at Redhill and Tunbridge Wells respectively. Regard is had, as far as possible, to local conditions as regards the Auxiliaries; but to make up this corps to its normal strength, it is found necessary to add a brigade of Irish Militia; and if the alarm came, the Kilkenny, King's County, and Limerick County battalions would at once find themselves on the way to the ground which, by work carried out quietly all over the kingdom, has been carefully surveyed and reported suitable for their reception near Redhill.

"Of the other five, or more purely defensive corps, there being eight in all, the headquarters of the 1st Division of each are severally assigned to Dublin, Salisbury, Chester, York, and Edinburgh; the particular division in each case has its special nucleus of a 1st Brigade of three battalions of Regulars drawn from the nearest sets of barracks; and the headquarters of the other two divisions are so fixed that the best use may be made of the communications of the country, if it be necessary to throw the three together into one formidable mass. Somewhat the same remark may be applied to the 2nd Brigade of each division, which is usually near, but not with, the first or head quarter brigade, so as to consult the convenience of supply and training-grounds, until further concentration be compelled by circumstances.

"A large part of the forces, including a few regular battalions and the Garrison Artillery, is left out of the corps system altogether. This is for the reason that having spent so much in fortifying our dockyard property, we cannot leave the works to be garrisoned entirely by troops that would

have their real training to learn after the alarm was raised. Hence the formation of a distinct garrison, or sedentary army, divided into separate commands for Portsmouth, Plymouth, Portland, Dover, Chatham (with Sheerness and Tilbury)—in other words, the mouths of the Medway and Thames), Harwich, Pembroke, Edinburgh, Cork, Dublin, Jersey, Guernsey, and Alderney. Many of these include the charge of a large strip of coast. There is a special provision for those numerous petty works round the Irish coast bequeathed to us from the days when our fleet was judged insufficient to save of all possibility of a French Republic landing, and which are too scattered to become parts of any one or two military charges.

"With regard to the Volunteers a fair consideration of the conditions under which that force is raised shows that, although it might be perfectly possible to call it out bodily and train it, it would be most unadvisable in a national point of view to expect from it as a mass that prolonged service under arms which is a contingency to be thought of should a threatened invasion be actually prepared and yet delayed from time to time. For this reason it has been decided not to attempt to embody it in the corps of the field army, every man of which would necessarily have to be constantly present and ready to march at the word. It is assigned wholly to the garrison army. Each unit has its station; and that it may be represented at this fairly throughout the entire period of any mobilization which may be ordered, and yet no undue strain be put on the civil life of its members, one fourth of the effectives only would be required to be constantly present at headquarters, the regiment making its own arrangements within itself for their relief, which would thus be carried out in the freest possible manner as best accorded with the means and wishes of individuals. There are certain bodies of Volunteers, however, formed especially for the defence of their own parts of the coast line, and which would be mobilized, as it were, almost at their own doors. Of these, two-thirds might be expected to do duty constantly during the period. In this way—and no regimental training at Volunteer headquarters need be interfered with—about 50,000 effective men could be added to the garrison army, without putting any great hardship on that part of our force which undertakes its share of civil as well as of military duties. The metropolitan Volunteers, as a very important and representative body, are specially dealt with. They would form a distinct camp, stationed on the old historic site of Tilbury, and attended constantly, of course, by one-fourth of each regiment.

"It has been shown that certain chief points, as Dublin, for example, are the headquarters for a corps, as well as for a distinct part of the garrison army. It should here be pointed out that there need be no conflict of duties. The Corps General would be the senior while his quarters were in the Irish capital. But should some now Hoche or Humbert appear to vex the West, the corps would move at once into the field, and the local defence of the Bly pass entirely into the hands of the Major General at the head of the garrison troops.

"The Yeomanry fall as naturally into the field army as the Volunteers into the garrison. They are assigned in all cases to the corps to be mobilized near their own county, and put with its regular cavalry brigade or in the reserve. It is presumed they would be called out bodily only when danger was imminent. But in such case their services