The age of the parties and the pecuniary ability of the man to support a family are proper matters to consider in the reasonableness of the delay in a particular case. In this case the woman, plaintiff below, was twenty-three years of age when the defendant below first became her suitor. He was several years older. Her pecuniary means were quite limited. She was at service as a domestic servant. He was a well-to-do farmer, worth from $10,000 to $12,000. The promise was made, as she testified, in October, 1877, and repeated from time to time. She testifies that he passed the evening of October 4, 1879, in her company, remaining until after twelve o'clock; that he left promising to call the next Sunday and take her to church. He came not. She had understood they were to be married the next winter. She soon heard that he was paying attention to another lady. The second Sunday passed without his coming. She then wrote him, expressing her regret at his not keeping his promise, and her grief and pain at his neglect of her, and at his attention to another girl, and asking his forgiveness for some remark she had previously made. To this letter he made no reply, and never visited her after the previous 4th of October. Sunday evening thereafter she saw him at church in company with a young lady, and both looking at her in an insulting manner, but without speaking to her. *Held*, that a jury were justified in finding a refusal to marry. Marriage is a civil contract. A refusal to fulfil it may be as unmistakably manifested by conduct as by words. The true question was whether the acts and conduct of the defendant evinced an intention to be no longer bound by the contract. This has been held a correct rule in case of an agreement of sale of personal property. Freeth v. Burr, L. R., 9 C. P. 208. This rule applies with greater reason to a marriage contract, which should rest on mutual affection. *Wagenseller* v. *Simmers*, (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania). Opinion by Mercur, J.—[Decided May 2, 1881.]

Master and Servant.—A master retaining a servant in his employ through a stipulated term of service, cannot deduct from his wages for lost time, nor compel him to make up the lost time. He may discharge him for an unauthorized absence, but by receiving him back after absence he waives the right. [The converse of this was held in the city of New York recently. A servant of the city worked ten hours a day, at an agreed price per day, and subsequently learning that eight hours constituted a legal day's work, sued the city for compensation for the extra hours. Judge Barrett held that the servant was not bound to work more than eight hours a day, but if he did he was without remedy].—*Bast* v. *Byrne*, 51 Wis. 531.

DISQUALIFICATION OF JURORS.—Before the examination of jurors in the Guiteau case began on the 14th ult., Mr. Justice Cox made the following address upon the subject of the qualification of jurors:

"Before you are interrogated individually, I wish to make one or two observations: Under the Constitution of the United States the prisoner is entitled to be tried by an impartial jury. But an idea prevails that any impression or opinion, however lightly formed or feebly held, disqualifies from serving in the character of an impartial juror. This is an error. As the Supreme Court say: "In these days of newspaper enterprise and universal education, every case of public interest is almost, as a matter of necessity, brought to the attention of all the intelligent people in the vicinity, and scarcely any one can be found among those best fitted for jurors who has not read or heard of it, and who has not some impression or some opinion in respect to its merits.' If the prevalent idea I have mentioned were correct, it would follow that the most illiterate and uninformed people in the community would be the best qualified to discharge duties which require some intelligence and information. It is now generally, if not universally, agreed that such opinions or impressions as are merely gathered from newspapers or public report, and are mere hypothetical or conditional opinions, dependent upon the truth of the reports, and not so fixed as to prevent one from giving a fair and impartial hearing to the accused, and rendering a verdict according to the evidence, do not disqualify. On the other hand, fixed and decided opinions against the accused, which would have to be overcome before one could feel impartial, and which would resist the force of evidence for the accused, would be inconsistent with the impartiality that the law requires. There is a natural reluctance to serve on a case like this, and a disposition to seek to be excused on the ground of having formed an opinion, when in fact no real disqualification exists. But it is your duty as good citizens to assist the court in the administration of justice in just such cases unless you are positively disqualified, and I shall expect you on your consciences to answer fairly as to the question of impartiality, according to the explanation of it which I have given you."—Washington *Law Reporter*.

THE LAW OF BICYCLES AND TRICYCLES.—A tricycle, which was furnished with steam power upon a miniature scale, as an auxiliary force, was held to be within the Locomotives Act. Bicycle and tricycle law is thus summed up: "They are carriages, so as to have the guilt of furious driving laid at their door; they are not carriages, if asked to pay toll at a turnpike gate: but they are as much locomotives as traction engines, if they eke out their powers of endurance with steam, be it ever so little, or ever so carefully stowed away." —*Law Journal*.